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THE EFFECT OF WARTIME PRICE CONTROL
ON CONTRACTS FOR THE SALE OF GOODS*
LOUIS M. BROWN t and EDWARD RUBINI
To stabilize prices and to prevent speculative, unwarranted, and
abnormal increases in prices . . . to eliminate and prevent profiteering,
hoarding, manipulation, speculation . . . "' These, among others, are
the express purposes of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942.
Since the statute itself limits the sphere of control,2 the accomplishment
of the Price Administrator may fall short of full realization of the
prescribed purposes. To achieve these purposes complete control of the
price economy is probably required,3 and the recent amendment to the
Act is a step in this direction.4
Complete control may, however, permit some deviations and excep-
tions. Sometimes contracts made prior to the effective date of the
*The opinions expressed herein represent the personal views of the authors, and
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struction Finance Corporation.
tAttorney, Reconstruction Finance Corporation; Member of the California Bar.
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1. Section 1 (a) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 421, c. 26,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. (Jan. 30, 1942), as amended by Pub. L. No. 729, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess. (Oct. 2, 1942) (hereinafter referred to by the initial letters EPCA). In this
article, the constitutionality of the EPCA will be assumed. For discussion of the con-
stitutional problems involved, see Freund, The Emergency Price Control Act of 1942:
Constitutional Issues (1942) 9 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 77; Aidlin, The Constitutionality
of the 1942 Price Control Act (1942) 30 CALIF. L. REv. 648; Comment (1942) 55 HIMv.
L. REv. 427, 486.
2. Primarily, the EPCA is designed to control the price of commodities. But while
"commodity" has a broad definition under § 302(c), some matters are entirely free from
control, and others are subject to limited control. For example, neither rates charged
for professional services nor rates charged by public utilities may be regulated under
the EPCA, as amended. § 302(c). Services are subject to price control only if rendered
otherwise than as an employee in connection with the processing, distribution, storage,
installation, repair or negotiation of purchases or sales of a commodity, or in connection
with the operation of any service establishment for the servicing of a commodity. Ibid.
Cf. Max. Price Reg. No. 165 (services), C.F.R., tit. 32, c. 11, pt. 1499.101 ct seq.
(The Code of Federal Regulations is cited throughout as C.F.R.).
3. Message from The President of the United States, September 7, 1942, IH. R.
Doc. No. 834, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.; JACOBSTEIN AND MOULTON, Ei.FFEcrs OF TlE DiEruNsr
PROGRAI ON PRICES, WAGES AND PROFITS (1941); Comment, Legal and Economic
Aspects of Wartime Price Control (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 819, 821-824; Earley, Economic
Problems of Price Control and the Emergency Price Act of 1942 [1942] Wis. L.
REv. 334.
4. Pub. L. No. 729, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (Oct. 2, 1942). The amendment has been
implemented by Executive Order No. 9250, Oct. 3, 1942. 7 FED. REG. 7871 (1942).
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maximum price regulation are excluded.' Purchasers may be treated
differently from sellers." Exceptions may be made for particular con-
tracts.7  In such cases complete control is not lacking since the effect
on the price level of such deviations and exceptions is within the grasp
of OPA.' But whenever the effect of the economic activity of buying
and selling commodities is not the concern of an OPA regulation, a
gap in OPA's control occurs.
Potentially any contract for the sale of goods may afford an illustra-
tion of this situation. A price schedule or regulation fixes a maximum
price.' The provisions of the EPCA make it unlawful, regardless of
any contract between buyer and seller, to sell or deliver, or in the course
of trade or business to buy or receive commodities at a price in excess
of the maximum, if such activity is prohibited by the schedule or regu-
lation.'" Contractual deviations are thus condemned as unlawful. A
5. E.g., Rev. Price Schedule No. 47 (old rags), CF.R., ti. 32, c. 11, pt. 1347.101;
Rev. Price Schedule No. 51 (cocoa beans and cocoa butter), C.F.R., tit. 32, e. 11,
pt. 1351.51; Max. Price Reg. No. 145 (pickled sheepskins), C.F.RI, tit. 32, C. 11,
pt. 1314.151.
6. E.g., Max. Price Reg. No. 110 (resale of new household mechanical refriger-
ators), C.F.R., tit 32, c. 11, pt. 1380.101; Max. Price Reg. No. 139 (used household
mechanical refrigerators), C.F.R., tit. 32, c. 11, pt. 13S0.201. These regulations pro-
hibit only sales and deliveries at prices in excess of the maximum, but not purchases
nor acceptance of delivery. See note 10 infra.
7. E.g., Procedural Reg. No. 6, C.F.R., tit. 32, c. 11, pt. 1300.401 et scq. (pro-
viding for adjustment of maximum prices for commodities or services under government
contracts or subcontracts); Max. Export Price Reg., C.F.R., tit. 32, c. 11, pt. 1375.1
(provisions not applicable to certain exports outside of continental United States pur-
suant to contract of sale entered into prior to April 30, 1942).
8. The reference is to Office of Price Administration and will be used throughtut
this article.
9. Maximum prices established under the Executive Order No. 8734, April 11,
1941, creating the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply, are found in
price schedules. 'Maximum prices established since February 11, 1942, the date upon
which the Administrator took office under the EPCA, are found in price regulations
issued under § 2 of the EPCA. Under § 206 of the EPCA, price schedules, from Febru-
ary 11, 1942, have the same effect as price regulations. In this article, price schedule
and price regulation will be used interchangeably unless the context requires differ-
entiation.
10. Section 4(a) of the EPCA provides in part: "It shall be unlawful, regardless of
any contract, agreement, lease, or other obligation heretofore or hereafter entered into, for
any person to sell or deliver any commodity, or in the course of trade or business to
buy or receive any commodity . . . or otherwise to do or omit to do any act, in
violation of any regulation or order under section 2, or of any price schedule effective
in accordance with the provisions of section 206 . . . or to offer, solicit, attempt, or
agree to do any of the foregoing."
The schedules and regulations are not uniform with respect to the activities pro-
hibited. Some schedules and regulations prohibit sales, deliveries, purchases, and accept-
ance of delivery, at prices in excess of the maximum. E.g., Rev. Price Schedule No. 9
(hides, kips, and calfskins), C.F.R., tit. 32, c. 11, pt. 1314.1; Max. Price Reg. No. 150
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statutory declaration of unlawfulness, however, does not amount to the
exercise of economic control by OPA. The effect of the unlawfulness
will be determined by the courts rather than the OPA.
In this article we consider some of the consequences of the impact
of statute and price regulation on private contracts for the sale of goods.
ORDINARY SALES TRANSACTIONS
I. Sales Contracts Entered Into Before Price Ceilings In Effect
When the performance of a sales contract has been completely exe-
cuted 1' before the issuance of the relevant price regulation, the contract
(milled rice), C.F.R., tit. 32, c. 11, pt. 1351.451; Gen. Max. Price Reg., C.F.R., tit. 32,
c. 11, pt. 1499.1. Others prohibit sales, deliveries, and acceptance of delivery, at prices
in excess of the maximum, but not purchases. E.g., Rev. Price Schedule No. 6 (iron
and steel products), C.F.R., tit. 32, c. 11, pt. 1306.1. Still others prohibit only sales
and deliveries at prices in excess of the maximum, but not purchases nor acceptance
of delivery. E.g., Max. Price Reg., No. 110 (resale of new household mechanical
refrigerators), C.F.R., tit. 32, c. 11, pt. 1380.101; 'Max. Price Reg. No. 139 (used
household mechanical refrigerators), C.F.R., tit. 32, c. 11, pt. 1380.201. Where the
schedule or regulation prohibits the activity, violations are subject to statutory sanc-
tions: § 205 (a) (violations may be enjoined by the Price Administrator) ; § 205(b)
(willful violations are subject to criminal penalties) ; § 205 (e) (treble damage actions
against sellers who violate).
11. Whether or not a contract is executed is not always easy to determine. Thus,
under state fair-trade laws, payment and delivery may be completed, but the buyer may
have a contractual duty not to resell below a price fixed in the contract. In such a
situation the OPA maximum may be lower than the contractual minimum resale price.
Opinion has been expressed that in case of such a conflict the OPA price governs, and the
buyer may not be enjoined by the seller under a state fair-trade law from reselling at this
price. Helena Rubinstein, Inc. v. Charline's Cut Rate, Inc., 4 Pike & Fischer, OPA
Serv. ff 620:13 (N. J. Ch. 1942); Bissell Carpet Sweeper Co. v. Berg, N. Y. L. J., Nov.
4, 1942, p. 1314, col. 5 (Sup. Ct.); cf. Williams v. Yasner, N. Y. L. J., Sept. 26, 1942,
p. 759, col. 4 (Sup. Ct.). On the other hand it has been held that the retailer will be
enjoined from selling at any price. "Thus he will be safeguarded from prosecution at
the hands of the Federal authorities for violating the United States Emergency Price
Control Act of 1942." Schreier v. Siegel, 37 N. Y. S. (2d) 624 (App. Div. 1st Dep't
1942). Where the price regulation "freezes" prices, such a result means that violations of
the state fair-trade laws have been frozen, a view not taken by the OPA in every situa-
tion. C.C.H. War Law Serv. 1 49,613, 1 49,677 (1942) ; cf. Williams v. Yasner, N. Y. L. J.,
Sept. 26, 1942, p. 759, col. 4 (Sup. Ct.). Gen. Max. Price Reg., C.F.R., tit. 32, c. 11,
pt. 1499.18(d), sets forth a procedure for adjustment of a maximum price in certain
cases of conflict between a Fair Trade Act of any state and the General Maximum
Price Regulation. Assuming a transaction which is completely executed prior to the
price regulation, it is arguable that it may be regulated in order to prevent circumven-
tion or evasion of the Act. See EPCA §2(g). Otherwise, sellers and buyers might
hasten to complete transactions at prices higher than the ceiling prior to the issuance
of a regulation, and this would have an inflationary effect. Cf. Max. Price Reg. No.
174 (freight car materials), C.F.R., tit. 32, c. 11, pt. 1390.51, issued and effective July 2,
1942,' which requires that "the price at which any sale, delivery or offer to sell was made
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remains free of control.' But if the time for any part of the perform-
ance has not fallen due and the contract has not been wholly executed
on the effective date of a regulation,"3 inquiry should be made as to what
control, if any, is placed upon the executory portion of the contract.
A number of different situations may arise.
If payment of the price by the purchaser is the only remaining tn-
executed portion of the contract- the seller having fully performed
and title having passed -it seems clear that the payment is not subject
to control. Selling, delivering, buying and receiving are expressly pro-
hibited by the Act, but not payment;14 and indeed regulations seem
between May 26, 1942, and July 2, 1942, shall be adjusted so as not to exceed the maxi-
mum price herein permitted." But such a regulation might, where the contract is com-
pletely executed, present serious constitutional problems.
12. And this is true even though the prices are usually set as of sonic date prior
to the issuance of the regulation. E.g., Gen. Max. Price Reg., C.F.R., tiL 32, c. 11, pt.
1499.1 (issued on April 28, 1942, and using for most purposes the month of March 19)42
as the base period). Under the EPCA, "so far as practicable, in establishing any ma.i-
mum price, the Administrator shall ascertain and give due consideration to the price
prevailing between October 1 and October 15, 1941. . . ." §2(a). Under the recent
amendment to the EPCA, the President is authorized to stabilize prices, vages and
salaries, affecting the cost of living, on the basis of September 15, 1942 levels so far as
practicable and unless otherwise provided in the amendment. Pub. L. No. 729, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. (Oct. 2, 1942).
13. The typical regulation prohibits sellers from selling or delivering, and buyers
in the course of trade or business from purchasing, a commodity on and after a specified
date at prices higher than the maximum. E.g., Max. Price Reg. No. 36 (acetone),
C.F.R., tit. 32, c. 11, pt. 1412.51; Max. Price Reg. No. 120 (bituminous coal delivered
from mine or preparation plant), C.F.R., tit. 32, c. 11, pt. 1340.201; Gen. Max. Price
Reg., C.F.R., tit. 32, c. 11, pt. 1499. It is this date, rather than the date upon whic
a regulation is issued, which will be termed "the effective date" of a regulation in tfls
article. Usually, the effective date is subsequent to the date upon which the regulaticn
is issued. E.g., Max. Price Reg. No. 113 (iron ore produced in Minnesota, Wi-consin
and Michigan), C.F.R., tit. 32, c. 11, pt. 1369 (issued April 7, 1942, effective April 10,
1942); Aax. Price Reg. No. 121 (solid fuels delivered from producing facilities),
C.F.R., tit. 32, c. 11, pt. 1340 (issued April 29, 1942, effectise May 18, 1942); Yax.
Price Reg. No. 161 (soft-wood lumber-West Coast logs), C.F.R., tit. 32, c. 11, pt. :3SI
(issued June 10, 1942, effective June 20, 1942).
14. Section 4(a) of the EPCA, note 10 supra, is directed to transfers of possession
and title, rather than to the act of payment. Brief for Administrator, pp. 4, 5, Gdlban
Lobo Co., S. A. v. Henderson, 4 Pike & Fischer, OPA Ser. f 610 (U. S. Emergiency
Ct. 6f App. 1942). The distinction between a sale and payment is a customary one.
Under the Uniform Sales Act, apart from agreement to the contrary, a sale may tahe
place in the sense of the property in the goods passing at the time the contrmt is
made, even though the time of payment is postponed. Cf. Uxwonli SALES Aer §§ 1 19;
1 WILI.IsToN, SALES (2d ed. 1924) 3.
The typical maimum price regulation reads:
". .. On and after .......... , 194.., regardless of any contract, agreement, Late,
or other obligation, no person shall sell or deliver ............ , and no person ihall
buy or receive ............ in the course of trade or business, at prices higher than
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generally not to affect the payment of the price in such a situation.1
Conversely, if payment of the price occurs prior to, but delivery is
to take place subsequent to the effective date of an applicable regulation,
the seller's performance is frequently controlled.1" On the authority of
Section 4(a) of the Act, most regulations provide that it is unlawful
to deliver or to receive a commodity on and after a specified date "at
prices higher than the maximum prices."" But a declaration making
the maximum prices . . . , and no person shall agree, offer, solicit or attempt to do
any -of the foregoing. The provisions of this Section shall not be applicable to sales
or deliveries of ............ to a purchaser if prior to ........ , 194.. such ............
had been received by a carrier, other than a carrier owned or controlled by the seller,
for shipment to such purchaser." The last sentence indicates an intent not to include
a sales transaction in which only payment is to take place after the effective date
of the regulation. If payment were prohibited, the result would be to permit delivery
after the effective date by the independent carrier, of goods received by it prior to
the effective date, but to preclude payment by the buyer for such goods. If, on the
other hand, payment is permitted in this situation, then it is a fortiori permissible where
the buyer has received the goods prior to the effective date.
Whether a price regulation may specifically prohibit such payment is not clear.
Cf. Max. Price Reg. No. 174 (freight car materials), C.F.R., tit. 32, c. 11, pt. 1390,51;
see note 11 supra. There would seem to be no constitutional objection to a regulation
which makes payment of a price in excess of the ceiling illegal even though delivery
under the contract. has taken place prior to the regulation. Louisville & N. R.R. v.
Mottley, 219 U. S. 467 (1911); Calhoun v. Massie, 253 U. S. 170 (1920); Norman
v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 294 U. S. 240 (1935); but qf. Perry v. United States,
294 U. S. 330 (1935) (casting doubt as to the validity of such a regulation where a
government contract is involved). From the standpoint of statutory authority, the
validity of such a regulation could be premised on § 2 (g) of the EPCA, and it would
not run counter to any legislative history. Hearings before House Banking and Cur-
rency Committee on H.R. 5479, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 342; Hearings before
Senate Banking and Currency Committee on H.R. 5990, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 72;
SiN. REP. No. 931, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 19. The theory would be that, without
su.h a regulation, sellers and buyers could circumvent the purposes of the EPCA by
arranging for the sale, delivery, purchase, and receipt to take place in anticipation of
a price regulation, but delaying payment until after its effective date. The seller
thereby receives more than those who sell after the effective date of the price regula-
tion and thus brings a greater purchasing power to a market with a limited supply.
See Hearings before House Banking and Currency Committee on H.R. 5479, 77th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1941) 780, 1128; SEN. REP. No. 931, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1941) 1, 2;
Comment, Legal and Economic Aspects of Wartime Price Control (1942) 51 YALe
L. J. 819, 820.
15. But cf. Max. Price Reg. No. 174 (freight car materials), C.F.R., tit. 32, c. 11,
pt. 1390.51; see note 11 supra.
15. E.g., Rev. Price Schedule No. 9 (hides, kips, and calfskins), C.F.R., tit. 32,
c. 1, pt. 1314.1; Max. Price Reg. No. 150 (milled rice), C.F.R., tit. 32, c. 11, pt.
1351451.
17. See note 14 supra. The above phraseology, if not the happiest available, is at
least an elliptical way of providing that delivery or receipt of a commodity after the
effective date of a regulation is prohibited if a price in excess of the maximum has
beer received, is received upon delivery, or will be paid at some future time.
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the delivery or receipt of goods unlawful is not a determination, for
practical purposes, of the rights between buyer and seller. The seller
has the purchase price and the buyer has no goods and no "lawful"
prospect of receiving the goods. Since no solution appears either in the
Act or the regulations,' I the rights of the parties must be judicially
determined. It might be held that the parties should be left where they
are; but such a point of view seems both an undue hardship upon the
buyer and an undue benefit to the seller. 0 Or it might be held that the
seller is under a duty to return the purchase price to the buyer." Under
neither view is the transfer of goods consummated. Lawful transfer of
the goods could occur if the seller returned to the buyer the excess amount
of the price. Yet neither the Act nor the regulations require such partial
payment back, and customary principles of contract law negative the
likelihood that such a partial payment back can be compelled."'
18. The "no damage" clause of the EPCA does not cover this situation. "No person
shall be held liable for damages or penalties in any Federal, State, or Territorial Court,
on any grounds for or in respect of anything done or omitted to be done in gocd faith
pursuant to any provision of this Act or any regulation, order, price schedule, require-
ment, or agreement thereunder . . . notwithstanding that subsequently such provisf.n,
regulation, order, price schedule, requirement, or agreement may be modified, rescinded,
or determined to be invalid." §205(d).
19. Until the recent case of Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe
Barbour, Ltd., [1942] 2 All Eng. R. 122 (H.L.), 56 HAm% L. REv. 307, this %as the Eng-
lish view. No quasi-contractual obligation on the part of the seller to return the money
was implied in fact or law. Court Line, Ltd. v. Dant and Russell, Inc., 161 L T. 35
(K. B. Div. 1939); Chandler v. Webster, [1904] 1 K. B. 493; French Marine v. Ctm-
pagnie Napolitaine, [1921] 2 A. C. 494. But cf. WEnn3~, EFFE0r as' % or. Co:m.T'Lr
(1940) 118. The rule, however, was invoked in England in cases where the impossibility
had no relationship to the consideration received by the seller. It seems both unneces-
sary and undesirable to apply the same rule in cases arising by reason of price control,
where it is the excessive consideration received by the seller which excuses performance
by maling it illegal.
20. There is ample authority to support this rule. Export Syndicate of Steel Pro-
ducers, Inc. v. Dilsizian, Inc., 36 N. Y. S. (2d) 8G (Sup. Ct. 1942) (plaintiff buyer
entitled to recover back deposit made pursuant to contract entered into prior to the
issuance date of price schedule) ; Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Buck, 93 U. S. 24 (1876) ;
Louisville & N. R.R. v. Crowe, 156 Ky. 27, 160 S. WNT. 759 (1913); Von valdheim
v. Englewood Heights Estates, 115 N. J. L. 220, 179 At. 18 (1935); McCammon v.
Peck, 9 Ohio Circ. Ct. 589 (1895); 6 WIUIsToN, CoNmRAcTs (rev. ed. 193S) §§ 1972,
1974; R.STATr a=NT, CoNTmAcrs (1932) §463. Contra: Cowley v. Nurthern Pac. Ry.,
68 Wash. 558, 123 Pac. 998 (1912).
21. Such a result would mean that contrary to settled doctrine the court would be
maling a new or different contract for the parties. See Foley v. Euless, 214 Cal. 505.
511, 6 P. (2d) 956, 958 (1931); Englestein v. Mintz, 345 Ill. 48, 60, 177 X. rt 746,
751 (1931); Rosenthal v. American Bonding Co., 207 N. Y. 162, 168, 100 N. E. 716,
718 (1912); Elliott v. Crutchley, [1906] A. C. 7. But if the buyer accepted delivery
without judicial, legislative or administrative direction that the seller refund so much
of the price as exceeded the ceiling, he might be held in tadi delirto ,ith the seller
and not entitled to a refund. Infra, p. 88 et seq.
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In other situations, the performances of both buyer and seller may
be unexecuted at the effective date of an applicable regulation. The
regulations usually make it unlawful for the buyer in the course of trade
or business to obtain the goods.-2 Receipt of goods would in such event
22. See note 10 supra. But regulations may permit the performance of some con-
tracts which are unexecuted on the effective date. E.g., Max. Price Reg. No. 118
(cotton products), C.F.R., tit. 32, c. 11, pt. 1400.101: "The provisions of this section
shall not be applicable to sales or deliveries of cotton products if within the terms
of the Worth Street Rules title to such cotton products has passed to the purchaser
prior to May 4, 1942." In addition, there are a number of miscellaneous situations in
which transfer of possession is apparently permitted although payment and delivery
may take place after the effective date of the price schedule or regulation, Usually,
these exclude from the schedule or regulation performance under contracts entered into
prior to the effective date of the schedule or regulation. E.g.. Rev. Price Schedule
No. 47 (old rags), C.F.R., tit. 32, c. 11, pt. 1347.101; Rev. Price Schedule No. 51
(cocoa beans and cocoa butter), C.F.R., tit. 32, c. 11, pt. 1351.51; Max. Price Reg.
No. 145 (pickled sheepskins), C.F.R., tit. 32, c. 11, pt. 1314.151; cf. Max. Price Reg.
No. 123 (raw and processed wool waste materials), C.F.R., tit. 32, c. 11, pt. 1410.71
(contracts entered into prior to effective date at prices in compliance with Revised
Price Schedule No. 58, as amended, may be carried out at contract price).
Further, the typical regulation does not interdict delivery to the buyer where,
prior to the effective date, the goods have been received by a carrier, other than a
carrier owned or controlled by the seller for shipment to the buyer. E.g., Max. Price
Reg. No. 109 (aircraft spruce), C.F.R., tit. 32, c. 11, pt. 1312.351; Max. Price Reg.
No. 164 (red cedar shingles), C.F.R., tit. 32, c. 11, pt. 1381.1(d). The clause, how-
ever, does not usually appear in price schedules, and is not included in all of the price
regulations. E.g., 7 FED. REG. 1201 (1942) (reprinting all price schedules); Max,
Price Reg. No. 125 (nonferrous foundry products), C.F.R., tit. 32, r. 11, pt. 1395.
Even where used, the exception presents some problems. May a captious buyer contend
that it cannot receive the goods even though the independent carrier may? When is
a carrier independent in the sense that it is not owned or controlled by the seller?
Does this mean stock ownership? Does this mean control in the sense that the seller
has the power to recall the goods? If so, whether the exception is applicable may
depend on the nature of the bill of lading used, or on a court's ruling that a seller
never loses control of the carrier as long as he retains title or has the potential right
of stoppage in transitu. See 1 WILLISTON, SALES (2d ed. 1924) 632 et seq., 1325 et seq.;
Wilson v. International Ry., 160 N. Y. Supp. 367 (County Ct. 1916); cf. Rev. Price
Schedule No. 101 (citric acid), C.F.R., tit. 32, c. 11, pt. 1335 (providing that the effect
of the exception shall not be changed merely because the bill of lading, in order to
secure the seller, names a person other than the buyer as the person entitled to receive
delivery). Why, in any event, the distinction between an independent carrier and one
owned or controlled by the seller? Cf. Gen. Max. Price Reg., C.F.R., tit. 32, C. 11,
pt. 1499.20 (where the maximum price is based on the highest price charged for it
commodity delivered during March, 1942, a commodity is deemed to have been
"delivered" if during such month it was received by purchaser or carrier, including
carrier owned or controlled by the seller, for shipment to the purchaser). Probably
the explanation is that circumvention of the price regulation could be too easily plotted
if delivery to a carrier "controlled" by the seller prior to the effective date of the price
regulation removed the transaction from the regulation. Who has the burden of proving
whether or not the carrier is independent? Is it the defendant on the theory that lie
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be unlawful even though the seller defaulted in performance prior to the
effective date of the regulation.- In such case the buyer's remedy is
an action for damages for breach of contract.24 However, where the
seller's performance is not due until after the effective date of the
regulation, the fact that performance in violation of the regulation is
unlawful may afford the seller, on orthodox principles of contract law,
a valid excuse.2 1 Since the EPCA provides that exclusive jurisdiction
is asserting the defense of impossibility of performance? See Bernhardt Lumber Co.
v. Metzloff. 113 'Misc. 288, 1S4 N. Y. Supp. 289 (Sup. Ct. 1920); Commonvealth v.
Neff, 271 Pa. 312, 114 At]. 267 (1921) ; Taylor & Co. v. Landauer & Co., 85 Sor- J. 119
(K. B. 1940); cf. Schreier v. Siegel, 36 N. Y. S. (2d) 97 (Sup. Ct. 1942), rez'd on
other grounds, 37 N. Y. S. (2d) 624 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1942); Williams v .Yasner,
N. Y. L. J. Sept. 26, 1942, p. 759, col. 4 (Sup. Ct.) (both cases involving burden of proving
"good faith" compliance under § 205(d), the "no damage" provision of EPCA). Where
the seller is the defendant this presents no great problem because the seller can prove he
owns or controls the carrier. But where the buyer is the defendant, it would mean
that he must assume the burden of proving that the carrier is not indepcndeut or is
controlled by the seller, facts usually within the peculiar knowledge and control of the
seller. For cases holding that such burden should not be placed on the buyer, see Price
v. Haney, 174 Miss. 176, 164 So. 590 (1935); Besecker v. General Acceptance Corp..
143 Pa. Super. 367, 370, 17 A. (2d) 916, 918 (1941) ; see Farrall v. State, 32 Ala. 557,
559 (1858) ; 9 W ic,.roR, EvIDExcE (3d ed. 1940) § 2486.
Finally, a court might hold, apart from any provision in the regulation, that the
delivery which a regulation made unlawful did not refer to the physical act, but rather
that it occurred when the seller at some date prior to the effective date relinquished
"legal control" over the commodities. Cf. Swanee Fabrics, Inc. v. American Bleached
Goods Co., 36 N. Y. S. (2d) 456 (N. Y. City Cts. 1942). Yet there may be judicial
reluctance to hold that either delivery or a sale takes place prior to receipt by the
buyer. For example, in a Bow Street Police Court case, between the date of the price
order and its effective date, a company obtained one hundred and eighty-one orders
for coffee at a price above the maximum price upon an understanding that the coffee
would be held by the seller for each buyer and delivered as the buyer required it. The
magistrate held that the agreement for sale was not complete prior to the effective date
of the price order because the coffee had not been unconditionally appropriated. 4 Butter-
worth Emergency Legislation Serv. (1942) § 33, p. 39 (it is stated therein that this
case may be appealed).
23. Export Syndicate of Steel Producers, Inc. v. Dilsizian, Inc., 34 N. Y. S. (2d)
863 (Sup. Ct. 1942). "'Vhere a contract calls for delivery before the effective date of
the Regulation and the seller is unable to deliver because of a default by the buyer
(e.g., buyer agrees to supply tank cars before effective date of Regulation and fails to
do so) there is no delivery, and the maximum price must be observed. However, it may
be that as a matter of private contract law the buyer is liable to the seller for the loss
suffered by the seller as a result of the default by the buyer. Payment of judgment on
any such claim or settlement of any valid claim will not constitute a violation of the
Regulation." OPA Price Interpretation No. 13, Sept. 20, 1942.
24. Even if the receipt of the goods were lawful, urdinarily the buyer cannixt t.Itain
specific performance of a contract for the sale of goods. 2 WVILLISTON, S LES 12d Cd.
1924) § 602.
25. See 6 W\mLsToN. Cozrmscrs (rev. ed. 1938) § 193S; RESTATME.IE. CtaAUCrs
(1932) § 458; In re Kramer & Uchitelle, Inc., 288 N. Y. 467, 43 N. E. (2d) 493 (1942) ;
1942]
82 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol.52: 74
to consider the validity of a maximum price regulation rests initially in
the specially created Emergency Court of Appeals,20 it becomes a juris-
dictional inquiry whether the buyer, in his civil action, may test the
validity of the regulation which the seller claims as a defense.27
In re Kahn & Feldman, Inc., C. C. H. War Law Serv. f750,911 (N. Y. Sup. Ct., App.
Div., 1st Dep't 1942); cf. Edward Maurer Co. v. Tubeless Tire Co., 272 Fed. 990
(N. D. Ohio 1921), aff'd, 285 Fed. 713 (C. C. A. 6th, 1922); Comment, Legal and
Economic Aspects of Wartime Price Control (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 819, 840, 11. 100.
The burden of proving the excuse rests on the party asserting it. For cases involving
burden of proof arising out of the General Maximum Price Regulation, see Williams v.
Yasner, N. Y. L. J., Sept. 26, 1942, p. 759, col. 4 (Sup. Ct.); Schreier v. Siegel, 36
N. Y. S. (2d) 97 (Sup. Ct. 1942), rev'd on other grounds, 37 N. Y. S. (2d) 624 (App.
Div. 1st Dep't 1942). For additional cases see note 22 supra.
A special situation is presented where a maximum price is fixed by a voluntary
agreement between a seller and the Administrator pursuant to Section 5 of the EPCA.
For purposes of affording the seller an excuse from performing a pre-existing contract,
such agreement might be viewed as being equivalent to a statute or price regulation,
even though no statutory sanctions attend its violation. Cf. Dodd, Impossibility of
Performance of Contracts Due to War-time Regulations (1919) 32 -ARM. L. REv. 789,
796 et seq. For examples of these agreements, some of which exclude from their scope
preexisting contracts entered into in good faith, see 4 Pike & Fischer, OPA Serv.
161:101. In such cases the fact that the promisor was instrumental in bringing about
the change in law which caused the impossibility is generally not viewed as a material
factor. 6 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcTs (rev. ed. 1938) §-1938. Or the agreement might be
viewed as analogous to a private act, or executive or administrative order, sought by
the seller. In this connection it has been suggested that the promisor's activity In
obtaining the change in law might prevent excuse of his performance. Ibid. Or the
agreement might simply be viewed as a contract between seller and Administrator.
Cf. Fryns v. Fair Lawn Fur Dressing Co., 114 N. J. Eq. 462, 168 Atl. 862 (Ch. 1933)
(reemployment agreement with President of United States under N.I.R.A.). In such
a case, even if the subsequent agreement with the Administrator does not expressly
permit the performance of the preexisting contract with the buyer, nevertheless on
contract law principles the seller's performance should not be excused. Cf. Crist v.
Armour, 34 Barb. 378 (N. Y. 1861); 3 WILLISToN, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936) § 677.
But cf. Mawhinney v. Millbrook Woolen Mills, 231 N. Y. 290, 132 N. E. 93 (1921).
26. EPCA, §204(d). Compare Hatter v. Kittrell, C. C. H. War Law Serv.
149,647 (S. D. Ala. 1942), with Hatter v. Kittrell, Circ. Ct., Mobile County, Ala., Aug,
21, 1942.
27. The same jurisdictional difficulty would beset the seller where lie is the plaintiff
in an action in which the buyer asserts the price regulation as a defense. Vecchio v.
Kelly, 4 Pike & Fischer, OPA Serv. 622:5 (Circ. Ct., Wayne County, Mich., 1942)
(rent regulation under EPCA). Apart from the exclusive jurisdiction provisions of the
EPCA, the party defendant might contend that the "no damage" clause prevents either
the validity of the regulation or its administrative interpretation from being put in
issue in the civil action; for a person is not to be held liable for damages or penalties
where lie does or omits to do anything in good faith pursuant to a regulation, even
if the regulation is subsequently held invalid. See note 18 supra. But where there has
been no administrative interpretation of the regulation, the EPCA contains no limitation
on the jurisdiction of a court in the civil action to determine whether the regulation is
applicable to a given transaction.
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But the application of these customary principles of contract law to
maximum price control is not clear cut. Performance at or below the
maximum is still possible factually."3 If there be any justification for
the seller's non-performance, it is the increased financial hardship
on the seller, since a sale at the ceiling will gross the seller a
smaller total sum, or he will have to sell more units to obtain the total
contract price. Financial hardship, however, has, except in extreme
cases, been held no excuse for failure to perform. -9
Since a method is provided by OPA procedure to obtain administra-
tive change of prices to higher levels," the conclusion might be reached
that the seller's excuse should be conditioned upon bona fide instigation
and pursuance of this procedure.31 Such a result would unduly encour-
age protest of the maximum price and serve little useful purpose in the
effort of OPA to curb inflation. Furthermore, it might well be assumed
that regardless of the existence of prior contracts, sellers will endeavor
to obtain, through OPA channels, increased prices. Of course, if the
price level is increased by OPA before performance by the seller is due,
so that the contract price is not excessive, then performance is lawful,
and non-performance in most cases is not excusable. This is true
28. Even performance at a price in excess of the ceiling is factually possible, but
only if the performer is willing to violate the law. PESTrATE ME, CoN;vnmcrs (1932)
§ 458 (c).
29. 5 PAGE, CoXMAcTs (2d ed. 1921) § 2706; 6 Winusr::, Co::nTmcrs (rev. cd.
1938) § 1963. Held not excusable in: Columbus Railv.ay, Power & Light Co. v.
Columbus, 249 U. S. 399 (1919) (increased cost due to fifty per cent increase in
wages by action of War Labor Board); Moorhead v. Union Light, Heat &
Power Co., 255 Fed. 920 (D. Minn. 1918) (increased costs due to war conditions).
In North German Lloyd v. Guaranty Trust Co., 244 U. S. 12 (1917), a greatly increased
hardship due to war was held a valid excuse, but a similar hardship avs held no excuse
in Piaggio v. Somerville, 119 Miss. 6, 80 So. 342 (1919).
30. Procedural Regulation No. 1, providing for protests to price regulations and
schedules, petitions for amendment, and petitions for adjustment ror exception; Proce-
dural Regulation No. 2, providing for adjustment of rctail prices of commodities and
services; OPA-1065, Nov. 3, 1942, C.C.H. War Law Serv. I49,63 (1942) (individual
price adjustments limited) ; see Nathanson, The Emergency Price Control Act of 1942:
Admifnistrativee Proecduire and Judicial Revie'z, (1942) 9 Lxw & CoNTrcMs. Pnon. 60, 63;
Rava, Procedure in Emergency Price Fixing (1942) 40 fcE. L. Rnv. 937, 962-964.
31. The argument would be that a method of performance remained available until
an adverse administrative ruling. See Williams v. Yasner, N. Y. L. J., Sept. 26, 1942,
p. 759, col. 4 (Sup. Ct) ; Brown, The Effect of Conscription of Industry on, Contracts
for the Sale of Goods (1942) 90 U. oF PA. L. Rnv. 533, 549, n. 93; Comment (1942)
41 'MicH. L. Rv. 109, 147. But see Schreier v. Siegel, 36 N. Y. S. (2d) 97 (Sup.
Ct. 1942), rc,'d on other grounds, 37 N. Y. S. (2d) 624 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1942). If
such a burden were imposed on the seller, the additional question would arise whether he
would have to pursue his remedy beyond the administrative level to the Emergency Court
of appeals, the tribunal created by the act to review OPA rulings on protests. EPCA
§ 204.
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whether the increase is occasioned by administrative relief given at the
request of the seller or the buyer,82 or otherwise.Y3
Occasionally the seller might desire to perform prematurely. Since
regulations are frequently issued before the date when they are to be-
come effective, 4 the parties will have advance notice of "legal" prices.
A seller, under a contract providing for an excessive price with a fixed
and definite delivery date after the effective date of the regulation, may
desire to perform before the crucial date in order to command the higher
price. The buyer need not accept premature performance,"0 although he
may do so and become liable for the contract price."' Since the regula-
tions may be regarded as discharging the contract and thus the seller's
duty to deliver, it is to be expected that some buyers will welcome the
receipt of goods even at the higher price. There would seem to be no
obligation on the part of the seller to tender performance prematurely,
even though it is foreseeable that performance will be illegal on the
due date.
Certainty that performance will be unlawful on the due date can
be ascertained only on the due date." Yet sellers must frequently
32. Section 203(a) of the EPCA authorizes any person subject to any provision of a
regulation to file a protest. Rule 9 of Procedural Regulation No. 1 provides that "A
person is, for the purposes of this Regulation subject to a provision of a maximum price
regulation only if such provision prohibits or requires action by him." Ordinarily, it
will be difficult for either a buyer in the course of trade or business or a consumer
at retail to show that the regulation has caused him injury by prohibiting him from
purchasing or accepting delivery at a price above the maximum. However, it would
appear that buyers may seek amendments of regulations under Rule 35 of Procedural
Regulation No. 1 as persons "affected" by a maximum price regulation, but not
"subject" to it. See Nathanson, supra note 30, at 62, n. 14.
33. Short of discriminatory and arbitrary practices, there would seem to be no
restrictions on the power of OPA to revise an entire regulation upward, or to make
reasonable differentials raising the price ceiling in individual cases. EPCA §2(a)
states: "Any regulation or order under this section . . . may contain such classifi-
cations and differentiations, and may provide for such adjustments and reasonable
exceptions, as in the judgment of the Administrator are necessary or proper in order
to effectuate the purposes of this Act." See Nathanson, loc. cit. supra note 32; Comment
(1942) 41 MIcH. L. Rzv. 109, 117.
34. See note 13 supra.
35. Carolina Portland Cement Co. v. Roper-Strauss-Ferst Co., 33 Ga. App. 511,
126 S. E. 860 (1925) ; Arons v. Cummings, 107 Me. 19, 78 Atl. 98 (1910) ; cf. National
Importing & Trading Co. v. Bear & Co., 324 Ill. 346, 352, 155 N. E. 343, 345 (1927).
36. Leigh v. Cornelius, 65 Ga. App. 419, 15 S. E. (2d) 827 (1941); Sole-Leather
Over Mfg. Co. v. Bangs, 43 Minn. 23, 44 N. W. 671 (1890).
37. There is always the possibility that the regulation may be held invalid or may
be rescinded or modified prior to the date on which performance is due. Neuberg v.
Avery F. Payne Co., 37 N. Y. S. (2d) 366 (Sup. Ct. 1942) (price schedule amend-
ed prior to last date on which performance could take place under terms of con-
tract). By its terms the "no damage" provision of the EPCA (note 18 supra) does
not protect a person who fails to perform on the due date when the regulation does
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prepare in advance of the due date; and, since the certainty of the legal
obligation has vanished, practical difficulties for the seller are created. 3
To fail to prepare for performance may result in a failure to perform
with a consequent claim for damages. Completion of preparation may
result in expenditures pursuant to a contract that may become legally
discharged.
The seller might at some time prior to the performance date announce
his unwillingness to proceed. Anticipatory repudiation by the seller will
serve only to raise the perplexing question regarding the buyer's right
to maintain an action prior to the date when performance is actually
due. 9 Even more perplexing is the situation in which a price ceiling,
though in effect when performance is due, has not even been issued
when the anticipatory repudiation occurs.40
Excusable impossibility grounded on the EPCA may be of no more
lasting effect than the regulations issued pursuant to the Act.4 ' Tem-
porary impossibility is regarded as affording a temporary excuse for
non-performance.' Under the EPCA, price regulations with respect to
not prohibit such performance on that date, even though at some earlier date
performance would have been forbidden under the regulation. But where a party
breaches the contract on the due date because of compliance with a regulation, and
the regulation is thereafter held invalid, the "no damage" provision may immunize
such party from liability for damages, even though the regulation may be considered
void ab initio. Cf. FmLD, THE EFFEcT OF AN UNCONSTrMuTI0. AL STATU7u (1935) 3-8;
J. A. Dougherty's Sons v. Comm'r, 121 F. (2d) 700, 702 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941).
38. Likewise, the buyer may have to prepare for performance by making financial
arrangements or maling himself ready to accept delivery on the due date. See, e.g.,
Arons v. Cummings, 107 Mle. 19, 78 Ad. 93 (1910). See also the language of Justice Bail-
hache, in Anglo-Northern Trading Co., Ltd., v. Emlyn Jones & Williams, [1917] 2 K. B.
78, 84: "Now there is nothing more repugnant to business men who have to look
ahead and make their arrangements in advance than uncertainty as to their engagements
already made."
39. See 6 WIussoz, CoNrn-cxrs (rev. ed. 1938) 4996, 4997. Where the contract
has been entered into after the enactment of the EPCA, and the anticipatory repudiation
occurs after the regulation has been issued, the repudiator may seek to justify his
action on the rather untenable ground that the other party's promise is now illusory.
Cf. Topken, Loring & Schwartz, Inc. v. Schwartz, 249 N. Y. 206, 163 . E. 735 (1928),
criticized in (1929) 42 H.Av. L. REv. 829.
40. See 6 Wn.LSToN, loc. cit. supra note 39.
41. By its terms the EPCA, "and all regulations, orders, price schedules, and
requirements thereunder," are to terminate on June 30, 1943, unless sooner terminated
by Presidential proclamation or concurrent resolution by Congress. EPCA § l(b),
as amended by Pub. L. No. 729, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (Oct. 2, 1942) § 7. Actually,
price control may remain in effect for some time after the war is ended. Hearings beIorc
House Committee on Banking and Currency on H.R. 54179, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941)
776, 777. In part, the purpose of the EPCA is to prevent inflation resulting from
demands of an increased purchasing power on a limited civilian supply. This purpose
is not spent eo instanti the war ends.
42. REsTATE iNT, CoxTRAcrs (1932) § 452.
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their duration may be either "temporary" or "permanent. ' 43  This dis-
tinction is subject to the possibility that temporary ceilings usually
become permanent, 44 and permanent ceilings are subject to constant re-
vision,4" and even to premature death at the hands of the Adminis-
trator.46 From the point of view of the individual buyer or seller it may
be unfortunate that the law has no categorical rule of thumb by which
to determine whether the impossibility affords a temporary or permanent
excuse. The common denominator suggested is that the decision in each
case be based on a determination as to whether the applicable regulation
has persisted for a time sufficient to go to the essence of the contract. 47
Whenever it can be said that the performance after termination of the
regulation would impose a burden on the seller substantially greater than
would have been imposed on him had there been no regulation, the seller
is permanently excused.4"
Even if a price regulation does affect the essence of the contract so
as to impose burdens on the contracting parties substantially greater than
if there had been no regulation, the question still remains as to when
43. Under §2(a) of the EPCA permanent maximum price regulations must be
generally fair and equitable, use as their basis, so far as practicable, the prices pre-
vailing between October 1 and 15, 1941, subject to permitted departures, are to be
accompanied by a statement of considerations, and are usually issued after consultation
between the Price Administrator and representative members of the industry. Temporary
maximum price regulations, on the other hand, are not affected by the foregoing con-
siderations. They may be issued for sixty days only, and must establish as the maximum
price the price prevailing within five days prior to the date of issuance of the temporary
regulation.
44. E.g., Temporary Max. Price Reg. No. 1 (mixed fertilizer, superphosphates,
and potash), C.F.R., tit. 32, c. 11, pt. 1367, and Max. Price Reg. No. 135, C.F.R., tit.
32, c. 11, pt. 1367; Temporary Max. Price Reg. No. 7 (sill, waste), C.F.R., tit. 32,
c. 11, pt. 1338, and Max. Price Reg. No. 115, C.F.R., tit. 32, c. 11, pt. 1338; Temporary
Max. Price Reg. No. 16 (standard newsprint paper), C.F.R., tit. 32, c. 11, pt. 1347, and
Max. Price Reg. No. 130, C.F.R., tit. 32, c. 11, pt. 1347. Each of the above were
temporary regulations subsequently replaced by permanent regulations.
45. E.g., Max. Price Reg. No. 120 (bituminous coal delivered from mine or prepara-
tion plant), C.F.R., tit. 32, c. 11, pt. 1340, had been amended twenty-four times by
October 14, 1942. 7 FED. REG. 8354 (1942).
46. Compare EPCA § 204(a) : ". . . the regulation, order, or price schedule may be
modified or rescinded by the Administrator at any time" notwithstanding the pendeney
of a complaint in the Emergency Court of Appeals. Prior to the enactment of the
EPCA, in at least one case the Administrator revoked a price schedule. Price Schedule
No. 5 and Supplement No. 1 thereto (bituminous coal), C. C. H. War Law Serv.
1143,205 (1942). /
47. See Brown, supra note 31, at 551. But this test may become difficult to apply
where an installment contract is for a term substantially longer than the expected
duration of price control. And the additional problem is presented whether the long-
term contract should be discharged, or abated as long as the price ceiling is in effect,
or so abated and extended for the period of abatement. Id. at 549, n. 101.
48. Id. at 550.
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this determination should be made. Commercial practice might prefer
that the obligation of the contract or its discharge be determinable imme-
diately upon the issuance of a maximum price regulation. Satisfaction
of such commercial desires may run counter to administrative proce-
dures."9 The regulation might be amended,"' or an adjustment or excep-
tion might be granted." The impossibility may thus be short lived.
Commercial desires should stand by for a time pending the possible
employment of these administrative devices. 2 Further, unaided by the
lapse of time, courts would find it difficult to determine whether tem-
porary impossibility would cause substantially more burdensome per-
formance. Thus it would seem that the parties must at the outset regard
the issuance of either a temporary or permanent regulation as merely
postponing the time for performance.5
3
II. Sales Contracts Entered Into After Price Ceilings In Effect
It is unlikely that all sales contracts entered into after a price regula-
tion is in effect will call for the payment of a price equal to or less than
the maximum. Buyers and sellers may, wittingly'- or unwittingly, con-
tract for the sale and purchase of goods at a price in excess of the
ceiling fixed in the regulation. Others may seek what appear to be
avenues of escape in the regulations from the full force of their impact.c
49. See note 30 supra.
50. See note 30 supra. Although EPCA §204(a) provides for amendments to)
price regulations and schedules somewhat inferentially, amendments are frequent Rules
35 to 37, inclusive, of Procedural Regulation No. 1 set out at length an amendment
procedure. The value of this procedure might be lessened considerably if seller and
buyer were permitted to consider performance of their contract excused as soon as a
price regulation was issued.
51. See note 30 supra. EPCA §2(c) contemplates adjustments and exceptions, and
Rules 38 to 41, inclusive, of Procedural Regulation' No. 1 set out the procedure with
respect to petitions for adjustment or exception.
52. Neuberg x% Avery F. Payne Co., 37 N. Y. S. (2d) W6 (Sup. Ct. 1942); see RE-
STATE IEXT, CONTRPCTS (1932) § 286.
53. See note 47 supra.
54. Willful violations of regulations are criminal and subject a violator to a
maximum of $5,000 fine and one year of imprisonment. EPCA § 205(b). The typical
regulation provides that violators "are subject to criminal penalties, civil enforcement
actions, and suits for treble damages," provided for by the EPCA. Eo,., Max. Price
Reg. No. 120 (bituminous coal delivery from mine or preparation plant), C.F.R., tit.
32, c. 11, pt. 1340.206.
55. 'Many regulations now permit the making of a o.ntract tu ooll at a price n ,t
exceeding the maximum price in effect at the time of delivery. E.g.. Max. Price Reg.
No. 120 (bituminous coal delivered from mine or preparation plant), C.F.R., tit. 32,
c. 11, pt. 1340.203; Maax. Price Reg. No. 122 (solid fuels dealers), C.F.R., tit. 32,
c. 11, pt. 1340.253; Max. Price Reg. No. 145 (pickled sheepskins), C.F.R., tiL 32,
c. 11, pt. 1314.156. The regulations generally provide that, where a petition for amend-
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In addition, contracts may be entered into containing provisions effective
upon the termination of the price regulation. Not only is the lawfulness
or unlawfulness of such contracts subject to judicial inquiry, but, here
again, controversy between buyer and seller is not ended by labelling the
transaction "unlawful".
When it is judicially determined that a contract is unlawful, certain
legal consequences usually follow. Generally, the illegal agreement will
not be specifically enforced;"' recovery of damages for its breach will
not be allowed;"' nor will a party to such a bargain be permitted to
rescind and recover the performance he has rendered or its value. 8 The
parties are in pari delicto. Implicit in these rules is the belief that any
different result would encourage illegal transactions5
The EPCA contains statutory exceptions to the principle of par
delicto; but since an agreement is unlawful only if it violates a regulation
issued. pursuant to the EPCA, the exceptions must be read in the light
of the applicable regulation. For this purpose regulations are of two
kinds: those directed at both the seller and buyer, and those directed at
the seller only. 0
When a regulation makes it unlawful for the seller to sell or deliver
and as well for the buyer in the course of trade or business to buy or
receive, the EPCA subjects the seller to suit for damages 1 if the
ment or a petition for adjustment or exception requires extended consideration, the
Administrator may permit the making of contracts "adjustable upon the granting of
the petition." E.g., Max. Price Reg. 116 (china and pottery), C.F.R., tit. 32, c. 11,
pt. 1362.53; Max. Price Reg. No. 140 (sanitary napkins), C.F.R., tit. 32, c. 11,
pt. 1347.153. Cf. Max. Price Reg. No. 121 (miscellaneous solid fuels delivered from pro-
ducing facilities), C.F.R., tit. 32, c. 11, pt. 1340.243 (Administrator may permit adjustment
of prices "upon deliveries made during the pendency of the petition in accordance with"
its disposition).
56. 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1937) § 1630; Comment (1913) 26 MARV.
L. REv. 738; Stewart v. Thayer, 168 Mass. 519, 47 N. E. 420 (1897) (action for wageq
on Sunday contracts); Case v. Smith, 107 Mich. 416, 65 N. W. 279 (1895). See also
Lewis v. Ferrari, 34 Cal. App. (2d) 767, 772, 90 P. (2d) 384, 386 (Super. Ct., App.
Dep't 1939).
57. 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1937) § 1630; RESTATEtFNT, CONmTACrS
(1932) § 598.
58. Ibid.
59. 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1937) § 1630; Comment (1913) 26 MARV.
L. REv. 738; (1938) 36 MIcH. L. REv. 837, 838.
60. See note 10 supra.
61. EPCA § 205(e) provides: "If any person selling a commodity violates a regu-
lation, order, or price schedule prescribing a maximum price or maximum prices, the
person who buys such commodity for use or consumption other than in the course of
trade or business may bring an action either for $50 or for treble the amount by which
the consideration exceeded the applicable maximum price, whichever is the greater.
• . . If any person selling a commodity violates a regulation, order, or price schedule
prescribing a maximum price or maximum prices, and the buyer is not entitled to
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contract price exceeds the ceiling. The buyer, being in pari delicto, would
seem to have no cause of action, but the Act provides that the Admin-
istrator may bring an action for treble damages on behalf of the United
States. Thus the EPCA achieves the result of imposing liability on the
wrongdoing seller without lending aid to the equally wrongdoing buyer.
The Act does not prohibit a "consumer buyer" from purchasing, al-
though the seller is prohibited from selling. Numerous regulations follow
this pattern of one-sided unlawfulness. The consumer buyer is given a
cause of action against the seller "either for $50 or for treble the amount
by which the consideration exceeded the applicable maximum price, which-
ever is greater, plus reasonable attorney's fees and costs as determined
by the court."6
Some regulations, however, leave all buyers free of control and pro-
hibit only sales or deliveries by the seller at a price in excess of the
maximum. 3 Suppose that a seller, S, and B, a buyer, enter into a con-
tract at an excess price. Breach by either will very likely be followed
by a claim for legal remedy by the other. But on breach by S, B can
hardly show damages since presumably his purchase was at a price higher
than that at which he is able to get comparable goods elsewhere. On
breach by B, S will be unable to maintain an action since his making of
the contract was an unlawful act. The contract may, however, be per-
formed rather than breached. B may make payment in excess of the
maximum and seek a refund of such excess. The provisions of the
EPCA do not prevent recovery. Neither by entering into the contract
nor by making paymenf did B violate any express provision of this
statute or the regulation. Nevertheless, on the principle of pari delicto,
in one case arising in connection with the Lever Act, 4 recovery was
denied to B in a similar situation. In Mancourt-Winters Coal Company
v. Ohio and Michigan Coal Company," S and B contracted for a year's
delivery of coal, from April 1, 1917 to March 30, 1918. The contract
was executed prior to the Presidential order under the Lever Act fixing
the maximum price for coal at $2 per ton. This maximum was below
the contract price of $2.75 per ton, but since the Lever Act did not apply
retroactively, the contract was not affected by the order. Subsequently
another order raised the ceiling 45 cents per ton, but still left the
maximum price below the contract price. Nevertheless the parties there-
after attempted to tack this price increase to the contract price and in
bring suit or action under this subsection, the Administrator may bring such action
under this subsection on behalf of the United States. Any suit or action under this
subsection . . . shall be instituted within one year after delivery is completed ... 
62. Ibid.
63. For reference to illustrative regulations, see note 10 supra.
64. 40 STAT. 276 (1917).
65. 217 Mlich. 449, 187 N. NV. 408 (1922).
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addition to extend the contract for another month - the month of April,
1918. When S sued B for failure to pay the increased price for deliveries
during March and April, 1918, B sought to set off the increased price
of 45 cents paid to S for the months prior to April under the amended
contract. With seeming inconsistency the court refused to permit B to
set this amount off,"6 although S was allowed to recover for the coal
delivered during the extra month at the old contract rate of $2.75 per
ton rather than at the increased rate of $3.20 per ton. That statute
was aimed only at S, but the court found the parties in part delicto "
in entering into a contract which the law forbade one of them to make.
The difference in treatment afforded plaintiff and defendant in the
Mancourt case, difficult as it may be to justify in view of the court's
66. Accord: Detroit Edison Co. v. Wyatt Coal Co., 293 Fed. 489 (C. C. A. 4th,
1923); New York & Pennsylvania Co. v. Cunard Coal Co., 286 Pa. 72, 132 Atl, 828
(1926). Cf. Badger Coal & Coke Co. v. Sterling Midland Coal Co., 180 Wis. 79,
192 N. W. 461 (1923). But cf. Comp. Gen. Dec. B-25739, C. C. H. War Law Serv. 49,578
(1942), where the Comptroller General held that the Mervis Iron and Metal Company was
entitled to a refund of payments in excess of the ceiling price made to the Veterans
Administration for deliveries taking place after the enactment of the EPCA but pursuant
to a contract entered into prior to the passage of the Act.
67. "To say the least, defendant in knowingly entering into an illegal contract
would be aiding and abetting a violation of the law." Mancourt-Winters Coal Co. v.
Ohio & Michigan Coal Co., 217 Mich. 449, 453, 187 N. W. 408, 409 (1922). But it is
doubtful whether in a criminal sense a buyer who is not expressly included within
the scope of a price regulation is ipso facto an aider or abetter of or conspirator with
the seller. See United States v. Katz, 271 U. S. 354 (1926); United States v.
Farrar, 38 F. (2d) 515 (D. Mass. 1930), aff'd, 281 U. S. 624, (1930); Note (1930)
68 A. L. R. 895.
68. There is, however, authority for the view that when the actions of only one
party to the contract are made unlawful, the doctrine of pari delicto does not preclude
the other party from recovering moneys paid. McDuffee v. Hayden-Coeur D'Alene
Irrig. Co., 25 Idaho 370, 138 Pac. 503 (1913); Penn-Allen Cement Co. v. Phillips &
Sutherland, 182 N. C. 437, 109 S. E. 257 (1921); Comment (1940) 26 VA. L. Rev.
362, 365; Cf. WEBB R, EFFECT OF WAR ON CONTRACTS (1940) 118. And, while the
buyer may be in pari delicto even though criminal guilt on his part is absent, the iuere
fact that he is to some extent involved in the illegality does not mean that lie may
not repudiate the bargain and recover the value of his performance. Smith v. Bach,
183 Cal. 259, 191 Pac. 14 (1920); 3 POMEROY, Epury JURXSPRUDENCF (5th ed. 1941)
§§ 940-942; RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 604.
Section 10 of the English Price of Goods Act, 1939, spells out the rights of the
buyer against the seller where the latter has been convicted of selling price regulated
goods at an excessive price and the buyer has not aided or abetted the violation. Where
rights of third parties will not be prejudiced, a buyer, who does not permit an unreason-
able time to elapse, may, upon tendering goods substantially in the same state as when
acquired, avoid the sale and recover the price paid. Or he may affirm the sale and
recover any loss taking into account any consideration to be received on a resale or
agreement to resell. WEBBER, rupra at 117. Butterworth, Emergency Legislation Serv.
Statutes Supp. No. 2 (1942) 48.
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reasoning that both parties were in pari delicto, 9 may cause little harm
even if applied to similar fact situations arising by reason of the EPCA.
If a buyer is not allowed to recover back the excessive price, it will make
him less eager to enter into agreements with a seller who may be violating
a price regulation. Nor would it always be necessary to permit the buyer
to recover in order to advance public policy.7 In addition to criminal
sanctions7 and the remedy of injunction against a seller,' - where a
buyer is not entitled to sue the seller, the Administrator may bring an
action against S for either $50 or treble the amount by which the con-
sideration exceeded the applicable maximum price, whichever is greater.
73
Further, this provision in the EPCA should mitigate against the vice
of the Afancourt decision in permitting S to recover at the original
contract rate of $2.75 for deliveries made during April, 1918. If a
seller under an excessive price agreement is granted recovery of the
"lawful" price, he will not shy away from entering into such agree-
ments.74 But the "treble damage" provisions should prove a useful
deterrent.75
Unlawfulness may occur in ways other than excess sales price. The
EPCA provides that the Administrator may require a license as a condi-
69. Strictly viewed, the rule of the Mancourt case would deny recovery to a buyer
not covered by the regulation only where he "knowingly" entered into the agreement
with the violator. See note 67 supra. Cf. Detroit Edison Co. v. Wyatt Coal Co., 293
Fed. 489, 495 (C. C. A. 4th, 1923); Badger Coal & Coke Co. v. Sterling Midland
Coal Co., 180 Wis. 79, 192 N. IV. 461 (1923).
70. Cf. 3 Pommoy, EQtirr JURISPRU IXE (5th ed. 1941) § 941.
71. EPCA §205(b). Most violations of the EPCA must be "willful" for the
criminal penalties to attach.
72. EPCA §205(a). It has been held that an injunction is available under this
section, although only a single violation of Section 4 is alleged. See Henderson v.
Glosser, 46 F. Supp. 458 (W. D. Pa. 1942); Henderson v. Glosser, 46 F. Supp. 460
(W- D. Pa. 1942).
73. EPCA §205(e). See note 61 supra. The advantage to the seller in having
the action brought by the Administrator under Section 205(e), rather than by the
buyer independently of this section, is that the EPCA statute of limitations for the
action by the Administrator is much shorter than the usual statute applicable to contract
or quasi-contract actions. Under the EPCA the action must be brought within one
year after delivery is completed.
74. If sellers were assured that agreements for excessive prices would at wvorst
result in recovery of the "laxful" price, they might be willing to assume the risk of a
suit for an injunction, which will cause them no out-of-pocket loss other than court
costs, and of a criminal action where the prosecution has the burden of proving a
"willful" violation. As to when a violation is "willful," see United States v. Illinois
Cent. R.R., 303 U. S. 239, 243 (1937); California v. Latimer, 305 U. S. 255, 261
(1938); American Surety Co. v. Sullivan, 7 F. (2d) 605, 606 (C. C. A. 2d, 195);
Arrow Distilleries v. Alexander, 109 F. (2d) 397, 406 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940), cecrt. demicd,
310 U. S. 646 (1940); Comment, Legal and Economic Aspects of Warhre Price
Control (1942) 51 YAI.E L. J. 819, 843-844.
75. Cf. Comment (1942) 55 HIAv. L. ]Rv. 429, 497.
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tion of selling76 and that under certain circumstances the license may
be suspended." Some but not all regulations require a license as a con-
dition of selling.78 Although neither the EPCA nor any regulation pro-
vides that the vendor whose license has been suspended may not recover
the price of goods sold without a license, recovery will probably be
denied.7"
The EPCA limits the period during which a license may be suspended
to twelve months."0 It w6uld seem that the seller will be denied recovery
of the price of any goods sold during the suspended period even though
a license is reissued.8' However, the suspension of a seller's license ought
not to be a valid defense to an action brought on a cause of action that
accrued prior to the time of suspension.
Other regulations require that the seller file certain records and re-
ports, 2 give certain information to purchasers,8 3 and perform other
duties. Violations of regulations requiring the seller to make reports,
furnish information or perform other similar duties, although they may
lead to suspension of licenses, 4 are only collaterally connected with the
sales contract and hence should not in themselves bar recovery on con-
tracts made while such violations are extant.8'
SALES TRANSACTIONS IN WHICH SELLER OR T-IlRD PARTY
HAS SECURITY TITLE
Reservation of a security title in the seller or a third person is not
an uncommon incident of either the simple or more complex sales trans-
76. EPCA §205(f) (1).
77. EPCA §205(f) (2).
78. E.g., no license; Max. Price Reg. No. 164 (red cedar shingles), C.F.R.,
tit. 32, c. 11, pt. 1381; license: Max. Price Reg. No. 211 (cotton ginning services),
C.F.R., tit. 32, c. 11, pt. 1499.562.
79. Ayulo v. Mollen, Thompson & James Co., 283 Fed. 863 (N. D. Ohio 1922);
Morris Adler & Co. v. J. E. Jones & Co., 208 Ala. 481, 94 So. 816 (1922) ; Segal v.
Chemical .Importing & Mfg. Co., 205 App. Div. 220, 199 N. Y. Supp, 250 (1st Dep't
1923). But cf. Bell v. Lamborn, 2 F. (2d) 205 (C. C. A. 4th, 1924) ; W. H. Goff Co.
v. Lamborn & Co., 281 Fed. 613 (C. C. A. 5th, 1922), cert. denicd, 260 U. S. 734
(1922). However, where the buyer has paid the unlicensed seller, the buyer may be
precluded from recovering back the amounts paid. McShane v. Quillan, 47 Idaho 542,
547, 277 Pac. 554, 559 (1929) (unlicensed broker permitted to retain commissions paid).
80. EPCA §205(f) (2).
81. Morris Adler & Co. v. J. E. Jones & Co., 208 Ala. 481, 94 So. 816 (1922).
82. E.g., Max. Price Reg. No. 212 (frozen fruits, berries and vegetables at whole-
sale and retail), C.F.R., tit. 32, c. 11, pt. 1341.260.
83. E.g., Gen. Max. Price Reg. (requiring posting of maximum prices of cost-of-
living commodities), C.F.R., tit. 32, c. 11, pt. 1499.13.
84. EPCA §205(f) (2).
85. W. H. Goff Co. v. Lamborn & Co., 281 Fed. 613 (C. C. A. 5th, 1922), cerl.
denied, 260 U. S. 734 (1922) ; 6 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTs (rev. ed. 1938) § 1752.
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action. Typical are conditional sales, the trust receipt device, and letter
of credit transactions. The combination of a price ceiling and such a
security transaction poses problems whose ready solution is difficult in
some instances.
Suppose that, prior to the effective date of a price regulation, S delivers
a commodity to B, a buyer in the course of trade or business, but
reserves title to himself until B makes full payment. Prior to the date
upon which final payment falls due, a price regulation is issued estab-
lishing a ceiling below the contract rate. It could be argued that the
transfer of the security title from S to B upon payment is not a sig-
nificant factor, and that neither the EPCA nor the usual price regula-
tion prohibits payments alone:" Or it could be argued that by definition
sale includes transfer s - and a transfer of a commodity is not complete
until the buyer obtains the seller's security interest."9 But such a con-
tention creates so many problems as almost to preclude its judicial
acceptance.8 9 Shall the court compel S to accept only the maximum price?
Judicial action of this sort could hardly be reconciled with the dogma
that courts do not write or rewrite contracts for the parties." Shall
the court permit S to obtain the goods from B-?P In most cases this
would simply permit S to choose another purchaser at a price no higher
than the maximum." In some cases the result would be more serious
than satisfaction of the whims of S. For example, by compelling B
to return the goods to S, the position of B's creditors might be im-
paired. 3 Or B might be deprived of the goods even though he had
86. See notes 13 and 14 supra.
87. EPCA § 302(a): "The term 'sale' includes sales, dispositions, exchanges, leases.
and other transfers ... "
88. With reference to conditional sales, Williston writes: "These cases present
a typical . . . case of a sale to take effect in the future by force of its own terms,
without further expression of assent by the seller." 1 WILLisToN, SALE.S (2d ed. 1924) § 7.
89. Cf. Swanee Fabrics, Inc. v. American Bleached Goods Co., 36 N. Y. S. (2d)
456, 458 (N. Y. City Cts. 1942). "The Price Administrator could not concern himself
with technical questions of reservation of title or of the right to possession or of
symbolic delivery without at the same time opening up the question of intention between
buyer and seller in every transaction, making enforcement difficult and introducing
the possibility of easy evasion."
90. See note 21 supra.
91. Where the contract is illegal at the time it is entered into, S may not recover
even though B breaks the condition. 2 WILLISTON., SALES (2d ed. 1924) § 677.
92. Cf. In re Kramer & Uchitelle, Inc., 28S N. Y. 467, 43 N. E. (2d) 493 (1942).
93. Cf. UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES LAW § 9. Under the Uniform Conditional
Sales Act, where the conditional buyer has the seller's consent to resell, purchasers for
value in the ordinary course of business are protected even though the original contract
was recorded. And purchasers from or lien creditors of the buyer are protected where
the contract is not recorded pursuant to the requirements of the Uniform Conditional
Sales Act. UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALtEs LAW § 5.
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already made installment payments to S under the contract equal to
or in excess of the maximum price. 4
The security interest in the goods may be held by a third party rather
than by the seller, as in the letter of credit transaction. A seller, un-
willing to rely on the buyer's credit, may insist that the buyer obtain
a letter of credit in favor of the seller from a bank." Bank and buyer
then agree that the bank will issue a letter of credit, and the buyer will
reimburse the bank for payments made to the seller, pursuant to the
letter. of credit, or provide the bank with funds sufficient to meet the
seller's demands. Usually this agreement requires that the bank honor
the letter of credit only if certain documents, such as bills of lading or
dock receipts, are delivered to it by the seller."' In the letter of credit
the issuing bank promises the seller to make funds available to him
upon relinquishment to the bank of these documents of title." The bank's
security interest in the goods prior to reimbursement by the purchaser
may be evidenced by provisions in the agreement between purchaser
94. If S were permitted to retake the goods, B should be entitled to the installment
payments already made. Cf. Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, 54 STA'r.
1181 (1940), 50 U. S. C. §531(3) (1940). Otherwise B might even be in a worse
position than a conditional buyer who had actually defaulted under a contract not
calling for a price in excess of the maximum, for under the Uniform Conditional Sales
Act such buyer may compel the seller to resell the goods and credit the money to his
account. UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES LAW §§ 19-21. But if the payments are
returned to B, should not S be allowed a sum for the use of the goods by B? Cf.
2 WILLISTON, SALES (2d. ed. 1924) § 579. Yet if this result is reached would not S
if he sells the goods again at the maximum price in effect have realized a sum greater
than the maximum, that is, his selling price plus the payments received for temporary
use? Similar practices have been condemned by OPA. See OPA Release No. 205,
C. C. H. War Law Serv. 49,605 (1942) (warning dealers who charge exorbitant
rentals for used refrigerators and compel purchasers to pay ceiling prices in addition
to these rentals).
95. See Thayer, Irrevocable Credits in Intcrnational Commerce: Their Legal Effects
(1937) 37 COL. L. REv. 1326.
96. E.g., Anglo-South American Trust Co. v. Uhe, 261 N. Y. 150, 184 N. E. 741
(1933) ; Brown v. C. Rosenstein Co., 120 Misc. 787, 200 N. Y. Supp. 491 (Sup. Ct.
1923), aff'd, 208 App. Div. 799, 203 N. Y. Supp. 922 (1st Dep't 1924).
97. The issuing bank is considered the purchaser of these documents rather than
the goods. See International Banking Corp. v. Irving Nat. Bank, 274 Fed. 122 (S. D.
N. Y. 1921), aff'd, 283 Fed. 103 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922) ; Crocker First Nat. Bank of San
Francisco v. De Sousa, 27 F. (2d) 462, 464 (C. C. A. 9th, 1928); Camp v. Corn
Exchange Nat. Bank, 285 Pa. 337, 132 Atl. 189 (1926) ; 6 MIcIIE, BANKS AND BANKING
(1931) c. 10, § 28. Actually, the seller may not seek payment from the issuing bank.
Instead he may draw a draft against the latter payable to a "negotiating" bank which
will pay the seller the face amount of the draft, less a discount, and obtain the necessary
documents of title from the seller. See Thayer, supra note 95.
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and bank,9s or bills of lading received by the bank indorsed in blank
or to its order,99 or a trust receipt obtained from the buyer. 00
Price regulations do not seem to be directed specifically against issuing
banks.1 ' The existence of a price ceiling lower than that in the under-
lying contract between the seller and the buyer, and a letter of credit
calling for payment to the seller of an amount in excess of the maximum,
will find the issuing bank in many cases beset by conflicting demands
of buyer and seller. The seller could urge that once it delivered the
proper documents of title to the bank, the latter must make payment
pursuant to the letter of credit, regardless of any illegality which might
98. In re Richheimer, 221 Fed. 16, 19 (C. C. A. 7th, 1915) . Anglo-S uth American
Trust Co. v. Uhe, 261 N. Y. 150, 184 N. E. 741 (1933) ; Benecke v. Haebler, 33 App.
Div. 344, 58 N. Y. Supp. 16 (1st Dep't 1899), aff'd. lob N. Y. (31, ('9 N. E. 1107
(1901).
99. E.g., International Banking Corp. v. Irving Nat. Bank, 274 Fed. 122 (S. 1D.
N. Y. 1921), aff'd, 283 Fed. 103 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922); Lamborn v. Lake Shore Banking
& Trust Co., 196 App. Div. 504, 188 N. Y. Supp. 162 (1st Dep't 1921), aff'd, 231 N. Y.
6161, 132 N. E. 911 (1921); see Brown, Documentary Conditins of Paymenit in Coll:-
mercial Letters of Credit (1939) 13 TmL L. rPLv. 495.
100. See, e.g., In re Bettman-Johnson Co., 250 Fed. t,57 (C. C. A. 6th, 1918).
101. Even though a regulation does not expressly include the issuing ban: within
its scope, it is possible to argue that the bank receives a comm.dity in tile ckure of
trade or business within the meaning of a regulation, when it obtains the bill of lading
endorsed in blank or drawn to its order. Such a bill of lading gives the bakl rights
of ownership, control, and possession of the comnmodity. 1 Wmiustot, SuLLS (24 Cd.
1924) § 282; Pollard v. Vinton, 105 U. S. 7 (1881); Mvors v. Kidder, 10G N. Y. 32
(1887); V. T. Wilson Grain Co. v. Central Nat. Bank, 139 S. W. 996 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1911). Realistically, however, title to the commodities is in the bank only for
security purposes. And the bank is no more a receiver of a commodity in the course
of trade or business than any other third party who advances funds to a buyer for the
purchase of goods and then obtains a chattel mortgage on the goods as security.
In re Bettman-Johnson, 250 Fed. 657 (C. C. A. 6th, 1918) ; 1 WILLISTo:. S.ua.;s (2,1
ed. 1924) §§ 282-286. And the same reasoning should preclude a bank from being
considered as a seller or deliverer of the commodity when it relinquishes the document
of title to the buyer. But ef. Moors v. Kidder, 106 N. Y. 32 (187) ; In re Bettman-
Johnson, 250 Fed. 657 (C. C. A. 6th, 1918). This does not mean, however, that in
a given factual situation an issuing bank, which is party to an agreement pursuant to
which seller or buyer or both agree willfully to violate the EPCA, would b immune
from prosecution for conspiring to defraud the United States or commit an offense
against the United States. See 35 STAT. 1096 (1909), 18 U. S. C. § 8 (1940); United
States v. Falcone, 311 U. S. 205, 210 (1940). Likewise,. where the issuing ban: ma!:es
a payment in excess of the ceiling to a seller with knowledge that seller ,r buyer
intends to violate or is willfully violating a price regulation, tr with such kMnwlcdgQ
transfers the documents of title to a buyer barred from receiving the gecds at a price
in excess of the maximum, the issuing bank might be prosecuted fo~r aiding or abetting
a crime against the United States. See 35 STAT. 1152 (1909), 18 U. S. C. §550 (1941);
Rosencranz v. United States, 155 Fed. 38, 42 (C. C. A. 9th, 1907).
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taint the underlying contract.1 02 But there is increasing judicial support
for the view that the buyer may enjoin payment in full by the bank,
at least where the bank has knowledge that the seller seeks to violate
the price regulation by obtaining the full amount called for by the
letter of credit.1
0 3
If, however, when the issuing bank actually makes full payment, it
has in the exercise of reasonable diligence failed to discover the seller's
unlawful action, the bank may insist that in all fairness it should be
able to obtain reimbursement from the buyer.1"' The issuing bank has
violated neither its agreement with the buyer nor the provisions of the
letter of credit. Yet such a result causes the buyer to receive goods
at a price in excess of the maximum. Reimbursement by the buyer
would thus be illegal, and it is to be expected that the buyer will refuse
to make full payment to the bank. Nor would the bank be likely to
prevail in an action against the buyer for reimbursement. To permit
such recovery would be contrary to the "no damage" provision of the
EPCA °5 where the buyer in good faith has attempted to comply with
the price regulation by tendering to the bank an amount equal to the
102. The general rule is that the contract between bank and seller, arising by reason
of the letter of credit, is independent of the underlying contract between buyer and
seller. American Steel Co. v. Irving Nat. Bank, 266 Fed. 41, 43 (C. C. A. 2d, 1920)
(impossibility of performance of underlying contract) ; O'Meara Co. v. National Park
Bank, 239 N. Y. 386, 146 N. E. 636 (1925) (breach of warranty) ; Urquhart Lindsay
& Co. v. Eastern Bank, Ltd. [1922] 1 K. B. 318 (issuing bank held not justified
in refusing to pay seller amount of invoice though in excess of contract price) ; cf.
Laudisi v. American Exchange Nat. Bank, 239 N. Y. 234, 146 N. E. 347 (1924).
Actually, however, if the bank refuses to pay the seller, any attempt by him to avail
himself of the foregoing rule in an action against the bank, would probably make It
apparent that the seller was attempting to violate a price regulation by receiving
payment of an excessive price from the issuing bank rather than the buyer.
103. Sztejn v. Schroder Banking Corp., 177 Misc. 719, 31 N. Y. S. (2d) 631 (Sup.
Ct. 1941) (fraudulent seller shipped worthless material) ; Nadler v. Mei Loong Corp.
of China, 177 Misc. 263, 30 N. Y. S. (2d) 323 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (furs failed to arrive
from China because of disruption of shipping between United States and China, and
Japanese embargo). Cf. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Lawyers' Title & Trust Co., 297
Fed. 152 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924), cert. denied, 265 U. S. 585 (1924) (illegality in under-
lying contract, unlike illegal price which affects only buyer, affected both buyer and
bank since it concerned warehouse receipt, which represented the bank's security and
the buyer's goods). See FINKELSTEIN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF COMMERCIAL LE.TRS ov
CREDIT (1930) 244-247; Thayer, supra note 95, at 1333; (1942) 55 HARV. L. REv.
878, 879, 880.
104. See Sztejn v. Schroder Banking Corp., 177 Misc. 719, 722, 31 N. Y. S. (2d)
631 (Sup. Ct. 1941). The circuity of action arising where the buyer reimburses the
bank and proceeds against the seller might cause a court to hold that a bank need not
pay the seller an amount in excess of the price ceiling. Socit6 Metallurgique D'Aubrives
& Villerupt v. British Bank for Foreign Trade. II Lloyd's List Law Rep. 168, 170
(K. B. Div. 1922).
105. EPCA §205(d). See note 18 supra.
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permitted maximum."'8 Faced with this problem, a court might permit
the issuing bank to recover from the seller instead of the buyer.10T Or
the Administrator might by regulation determine whether the issuing
bank's recourse should be against the buyer or against the seller.
Less likely to cause difficulty as a practical matter is the case where
the seller demands that the bank honor the letter of credit only in an
amount equal to or less than the maximum price. Usually such a pay-
ment either will be acceptable to the buyer or else will be in literal com-
pliance with the terms of the letter of credit and the agreement between
buyer and bank, for these instruments generally call for payments by
the issuing bank to the seller "up to" or "not in excess of" a certain
amount.'08 But where the letter of credit requires the bank to pay a
stipulated amount, 0 9 payment of a lesser sum to the seller might permit
the buyer technically to avoid its duty of reimbursing the bank, inasmuch
as reimbursement is a concomitant only of strict observance of the terms
of the letter of credit."0 Prevention of inflation does not compel such
a result. Nevertheless the bank, by paying an amount less than provided
for in the letter of credit but equal to the price ceiling, is in effect forcing
the buyer to rewrite its underlying contract with the seller. 1 '
106. If the buyer refuses to make even partial payment to the issuing bank, a court
might permit the bank to be reimbursed in full on the theory that the buyer acted in bad
faith and therefore could not rely upon the "no damage" clause. Cf. Williams v. Yasner,
N. Y. L. J., Sept. 26, 1942, p. 759, col. 4 (Sup. Ct.) ; Schreier v. Siegel, 36 N. Y. S. (2d)
97 (Sup. Ct. 1942), rev'd on other grounds, 37 N. Y. S. (2d) 024 (App. Div. 1st Dep't
1942).
107. In the absence of provisions in the letter of credit a bank may not ordinarily
seek reimbursement from the seller. See Imbrie v. D. Nagase & Co., Ltd., 196 App. Div.
380, 187 N. Y. Supp. 692 (2d Dep't 1921). Even if this rule were to obtain wvhere the
seller's conduct has been illegal, the bank could protect itself in the case of letters of
credit issued after a price regulation by express language in the letter. For example,
during World War I in the Equitable Trust Company letter of credit the seller was
required to assure the bank that the transaction did not involve trading with the enemy.
'Mead, Documentary Letters of Credit (1922) 22 CoL L. REv. 297, 329.
108. For examples of such letters of credit, see Old Colony Trust Co. v. La,.yers'
Title & Trust Co., 297 Fed. 152 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924), cert. denied, 265 U. S. 585 (1924) ;
International Banking Corp. v. Irving Nat. Bank, 274 Fed. 122 (S. D. X. Y. 1921);
Bank of Montreal v. Recknagel, 109 N. Y. 482 (1838) ; Brown v. C. Rosenstein & Co.,
120 Aisc. 787, 200 N. Y. Supp. 491 (Sup. Ct. 1923), aff'd, 209 App. Div. 799, 203 X. Y.
Supp. 922 (1st Dep't 1924).
109. E.g., O'Meara Co. v. National Park Bank, 239 N. Y. 326, 146 X. E. 636 (1925).
Cf. Second Nat. Bank v. Columbia Trust Co., 283 Fed. 17 (C. C. A. 3d, 1923).
110. Banco Nacional Ultramarino v. First Nat. Bank, 289 Fed. 169 (D. Mass. 1923);
Anglo-South American Trust Co. v. Uhe, 261 N. Y. 150, 156, 184 N. E. 741, 744 (1933) ;
Bank of 'Montreal v. Reckmagel, 109 N. Y. 482 (188) ; see Brovn, Docnmentary Condi-tionsr of Payment in Commercial Letters of Credit (1939) 13 TuL. L R v. 495, 503 ci
seq.; Note (1928) 38 Y.u.a L. J. 111, 112.
111. The issuing bank might take the position that it loses its right to reimburse ment
only if it fails to comply with the material conditions set forth in the letter of credit.
Payment of a lesser sum to the seller, it would be, argued, is not a departure from a
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CANCELLATION AND ADJUSTABLE PRICING CLAUSES
Buyers and sellers, realizing that the EPCA will be necessarily imple-
mented by regulations, may in contracts initially free from price control
attempt to stipulate the effect of regulations subsequently issued. Little
difficulty is caused by provisions which merely invalidate the contract if
the contract price becomes unlawful before performance by the seller. A
more interesting situation arises where the parties attempt to gear their
transaction to the expected price ceiling by general provisions inserted
in the contract of sale.
Such a clause may provide that if the price or terms of the
contract violate an applicable regulation thereafter issued, then the
contract price shall be the maximum permitted by, and the terms
shall be in accordance with, the regulation.1 2 Prices set in accord-
ance with prices to be published in a standard trade journal have
been held sufficiently definite to support a contract;"" prices in valid
regulations are no less definite." 4 Although it is ordinarily the purchaser
who would request such a clause, the seller is scarcely in a position to
refuse the request. The seller's alternative after the effective date of
a ceiling lower than the contract price is either to sell within the ceiling
or to refuse to sell at all. Such a clause insures the parties that the sales
contract need not be renegotiated after an applicable ceiling becomes
effective." 5 This clause, if made applicable to regulations already issued
as well as those to be issued, would likewise serve to insure the con-
tinuance of the contract, since ceilings are subject to revision downward
by the Administrator. No regulation has been found preventing the
use of such a contract provision reducing the price stated in the contract
to lower levels, and indeed it would seem that any expressed desire of
material condition, as far as the buyer is concerned, for it can cause the buyer no daim-
age. Cf. Second Nat. Bank of Toledo v. M. Samuel & Sons, Inc., 12 F. (2d) 963 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1926) ; G. Jaris & Co. v. Banque D'Athens, 246 Mass. 546, 141 N. E. 576 (1923) ;
Bank of-N. Y. & Trust Co. v. Atterbury Brothers, Inc., 226 App. Div. 117, 234 N. Y.
Supp. 442 (1st Dep't 1929), aff'd, 253 N. Y. 569, 171 N. E. 786 (1930). But it will not
always be true that the buyer will want the goods at the lower maximum price. See
note 129 infra.
112. If the maximum is raised after the issuance of the regulation, the seller may be
able to recover up to the maximum, provided that the regulation does not by its terms
prohibit such increase and provided also that the contract price remains higher than
the maximum. See Comment, Legal and Economic Aspects of Wartimc Price Control
(1942) 51 YALE L. J. 819, 840; Highland v. Russell Car Co., 279 U. S. 253 (1929);
Bewly-Darst v. Chattanooga, 142 Tenn. 460, 220 S. W. 1083 (1920).
113. Boret v. Vogelstein, 188 App. Div. 605, 177 N. Y. Supp. 402 (1st Dep't 1919).
114. See E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Hughes, 50 F. (2d) 821 (C. C. A. 3d,
1931).
115. The clause may be of further benefit to the seller. A buyer might, apart from
the binding effect of such clause, welcome the opportunity of avoiding a preexisting
sales contract. For illustrations, see note 129 infra.
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the parties so to conform to the price in the regulations would be en-
couraged.
Other clauses seeking adjustable pricing may by regulation be invalid.
Some regulations permit of no provisions which, without OPA approval,
adjust the price stated in the contract to levels above the ceiling; and
this holds true even in the event of the declared invalidity of the regula-
tions." 6 Others allow limited types of adjustable pricing," 7 while others
are silent'1 8 In any event it should be remembered that regulations
control prices as of the time of delivery as well as of the time of sale.
Apart from a saving clause in a contract a price may, though lawful
at the time of making the contract, be unlawful at the time of delivery,
if in the intervening period the Administrator has, without qualification,
reduced the ceiling." 9
Though sellers seeking higher prices upon the declared invalidity of
an applicable regulation may, as a practical if not as a purely legal
matter,' conform to the prohibition against adjustable pricing in the
event of such declaration, no regulation contains a provision making it
unlawful for a seller to make the life of his contract contingent upon
the continued validity of a regulation. Thus a contract could provide
that the withdrawal of an applicable regulation terminates the contract.
The practical risk that a seller assumes - the loss of a particular buyer
- is offset by the probability that the price of the goods will have
risen. The Administrator's remedy, at that time, to be sure, is the
116. E.g., Max. Price Reg. No. 110 (resale of new household mechanical refrigera-
tors), C.F.R ., tit. 32, c. 11, pt. 1380.103; Max. Price Reg. No. 150 (milled rice), C.F.R.,
tit. 32, c. 11, pt. 1351.454.
117. E.g., Rev. Price Schedule No. 69 (primary lead), C.F.R., tit. 32, c. 11, pt.
1355.1 (a) : "Conditional agreeents. Nothing contained in Revised Price Schedule No. 69
shall be deemed to invalidate any agreement merely because the price is based upon
some future contingencA in types of transactions in which it has been customary to
quote prices based upon future contingencies: Provided, howe'ver, That in no event shall
such price exceed the maximum price in effect at the time of shipment." Cf. Max. Price
Reg. No. 203 (vitamin A natural oils and concentrates), C.F.R., tit. 32, c. 11, pt.
1396.204: "Adiustable pricing. Any person may offer or agree to adjust or fix prices
to or at prices not in excess of the maximum prices in effect at the time of delivery. In
an appropriate situation where a petition for amendment or adjustment or exception re-
quires extended consideration, the Administrator may, upon application, grant permission
to agree to adjust prices upon deliveries made during the pendency of the petition in
accordance with the disposition of the petition." But if payment is made without adjust-
ing the price, the parties will be precluded from claiming an adjustment McFadden v.
H. H. Lineweaver & Co., 297 Pa. 278, 146 AUt. 901 (1929).
118. E.g., fax. Price Schedule No. 8 (lithopone), C.F.R., tit. 32, c. 11, pt. 1335.651
et seq.
119. Such a qualification is found in Max. Price Reg. No. 182 (Kraft wrapping papers
and certain Kraft bag papers), C.F.R., tit. 32, c. 11, pt. 1347.301.
120. As a matter of law, judicially declared invalidity of a regulation may invalidate
it ab initio. See note 37 supra. Cf. Chicago, Indianapolis & Louisville Ry. v. Hackett,
228 U. S. 559 (1913). As a practical matter, the risk of criminal and other sanctions
for violations of a regulation make nonconformance unwise. EPCA §205.
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immediate reenactment of a valid regulation controlling the same com-
modity, wherever that possibility exists. 1 Buyers and sellers ought not
to overlook, however, the fact that neither judicial nor administrative
repeal of the regulations, nor the expiration of the EPCA, will work a
termination of a sales contract apart from language in the contract indi-
cating such intent. Nor will repeal of the EPCA or regulations validate
an unlawful contract.
122
Termination of contracts may occur in ways extraneous to price con-
trol. Breach of contract by the buyer gives rise to an action for damages.
From the point of view of controlling inflation, it would seem as danger-
ous in this situation to permit damages as it is to permit prices to get
out of hand. 2 ' A seller who feels that OPA has depressed prices may
seek financial recovery by insertion of a severe liquidated damage clause
in the event of breach or voluntary termination by the buyer. Liquidated
damage clauses are, at present, free of other than customary limitations
on such clauses.' 24 As a matter of general policy, it should be borne
in mind that termination of the war will very probably bring about mass
terminations of sales contracts, and if such mass cancellations are coupled
with severe liquidated damage clauses, the anti-inflationary program of
OPA may conceivably be upset.
CONTRACTUAL STABILITY AND WARTIME PRICE CONTROL:
A SUGGESTED APPROACH
Basic in the foregoing discussion is the principle of contract law that
a contract, legal when made, is excused when, due to change in domestic
law, performance becomes illegal.'25 The theory of allowing the excuse
is simply that it would be unjust to require performance or assess dam-
ages for nonperformance where a contract cannot, by virtue of legal
restriction, be performed. On a purely mechanical btest the principle is
applicable to maximum price control. But maximum price control pre-
sents a situation which, because it is not wholly analogous to other types
of change of domestic law, might well be given different treatment.
121. If the EPCA is declared unconstitutional, or if a specific regulation is declared
invalid because not within the scope of the Administrator's power, then the possibility of
reissuing the regulation does not exist. If, however, the regulation is declared invalid
because of some less crucial defect, the defect may be cured on reissuance. Thus, the
Administrator may readily remedy a regulation declared void because it is not "accom-
panied by a statement of the considerations involved in the issuance of such regulation
or order." EPCA §2(a).
122. See Morris Adler & Co. v. J. E. Jones, 208 Ala. 481, 94 So. 816 (1922); 6 WIL-
ISTON, CONTRACrS (rev. ed. 1938) § 1758.
123. It might be argued that to permit damages to get out of hand is more dangerous,
since there is no exchange of goods for the payment of damages whereas there is an
exchange of goods for the payment of price.
124. See 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936) c. 28.
125. See note 25 supra.
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Rigid application of the excuse may well be valid where, for example,
the government has, pursuant to current conscription-of-industry statutes
and regulations," preempted all of the goods available with which the
promisor might have performed a sales contract. Where there has been
preemption, the promisor cannot both perform and obey the law; but
what is more important for our purposes, no legally permissible alterna-
tive performance can be substituted.
A wholly different situation occurs in price control. The government
does not take away or preempt the goods. Goods are available with which
the promisor may perform. Price control determines not that perform-
ance cannot be made, nor even that performance is necessarily illegal,
but rather that performance at a price in excess of the maximum is
illegal. In price control there is a means by which the goods can law-
fully pass from seller to buyer - by a sale not in excess of the maximum.
In preemption cases there is no means by which goods can pass from
the seller to the buyer save by violation of legal prohibitions.
The problem in wartime price control is, then, whether the contract
price between buyer and seller can be and ought to be legally rewritten
so that the permitted maximum price is adhered to - or whether, because
the parties at one time bargained for and agreed on a price (which
in most cases was the "market price" at the time of the contract), an
administratively determined different and lesser price affords an excuse
to the buyer and seller. But an excuse from what? An excuse only
from performance at the contract price. The seller still retains the goods
and is privileged to resell them to the same buyer or others at a price
not in excess of the maximum. There is no "excuse" from selling gener-
ally. In fact, just the opposite course of action is expected of the seller.
It is hoped, not that he will hoard, but that he will sell his goods in
accordance with the permitted price. To afford an excuse then should,
in dollars and cents, not net the seller more than the permitted maxi-
mum." 7 Thus, while there is no doubt that, in commercial practice,
the great bulk of the buyer-seller agreements will continue to be per-
126. See Brown, The Effect of Conscription of Industry on Contracts for the Sale of
Goods (1942) 90 U. OF PA. L. REv. 533.
127. In Perry v. United States, 294 U. S. 330, 355, 357 (1935), Chief Justice Hughes,
in discussing the Gold Clause Resolution said, in the opinion for the majority: "But the
change in the weight of the gold dollar did not necessarily cause loss to the plaintiff of
the amount claimed. The question of actual loss cannot fairly be determined without con-
sidering the economic situation at the time the Government offered to pay him the $10,0)0,
the face of his bond, in legal tender currency. . . . Plaintiff demands the 'equivalent' in
currency of the gold coin promised. But 'equivalent' cannot mean more than the amount
of money which the promised gold coin would be worth to the bondholder for the pur-
poses for which it could legally be used. That equivalence or worth could not properly
be ascertained save in the light of the domestic and restricted market which the Congress
had lawfully established. . . . Plaintiff has not shown, or attempted to show, that in
relation to buying power he has sustained any loss whatever."
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formed at the maximum allowed, many sellers 128 or buyers1 21 for varying
reasons will demand a discharge.
Rent regulation 130 affords an analogy. Under wartime rent control the
seller of the leasehold is not freed of his obligation to the particular
buyer of the leasehold, even though the amount of rent recoverable by
the lessor may be diminished.'81 In rent control, it is not merely that
the landlord may not charge more rent for his premises than the maxi-
mum, but that the particular tenant may remain in possession and need
pay no more than the maximum.1 2  Whenever the lease price conflicts
with the maximum, the sanctity of the price provision of the lease is
no longer safeguarded. The result is justified economically on the ground
that an opposite result would dispossess tenants and cause renegotiation
of lease agreements with consequent social hardships.'
However, renegotiation and the making of new sales contracts become
the order of the day when an issued regulation has the effect of dis-
charging the preexisting contracts. But statutory unlawfulness need
not result in the discharge of contracts, if proper provision is made for
substituted performance. The "Gold Clause" resolution 8 4 and the "Gold
128. Sellers may welcome discharge of preexisting contracts for a variety of rea-
sons. The preexisting sale may be for goods in large lots, whereas, after a regulation,
the seller may seek to sell in smaller'lots at a higher though lawfully valid unit price.
See, e.g., Price Schedule No. 9 (tea), C.F.R., tit. 32, c. 11, pt. 1351.261(f). The seller
may desire not to sell at all and wait for possible increases in the price ceiling. Or he
may desire to favor certain customers after a ceiling is in effect; whereas that desire
may not have existed in a free price economy. If some purchasers are better credit risks
than others, the seller would tend to favor those with higher credit ratings.
129. Buyers will not always desire to receive goods at the ceiling even though that
might be at a price less than the contract. In a rapidly changing economy, the buyer
may not need goods he contracted to receive. For example, governmental requisition-
ing may have changed the buyer's business f'om a "civilian" to a "defense" business and
the goods ordered are useful only for "civilian" purposes. Or the buyer may no longer
want the goods because of profit motives. For example, the price for which the buyer
can resell may be controlled, and he may feel that the margin between cost price and
resale price is not ample to warrant his dealing in the goods.
130. EPCA §2(b).
131. EPCA § 4(b): "It shall be unlawful for any person to remove or attempt to
remove from any defense-area housing accommodations, the tenant or occupant thereof
or to refuse to renew the lease or agreement for the use of such accommodations, because
such tenant or occupant has taken, or proposes to take, action authorized or required by
this Act or any regulation, order, or requirement thereunder." Section 4(a) of the EPCA
makes it unlawful, regardless of any preexisting lease, to demand or receive any rent
for any defense-area housing accommodations in violation of any order issued pursuant
to § 2 of the Act. For example, Mandatory Maximum Rent Regulation No. 18, C.F.R.,
tit. 32, c. 11, pt. 1388.861(c) provides that "The provisions of any lease or other rental
agreement shall remain in force pursuant to the terms thereof, except insofar as those
provisions are inconsistent with this Maximum Rent Regulation No. 18."
132. Vecchio v. Kelly, 4 Pike & Fischer, OPA Serv. 1622:5 (Circ. Ct., Wayne
County, Mich., 1942).
133. See Borders, Emergency Rent Control (1942) 9 LAW & CoNvMIP. Pou. 107.
134. 48 STAT. 112 (1933), 31 U. S. C. § 463 (1940).
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Clause Cases"' 35 that followed illustrate a constitutionally sanctioned
technique for preserving contracts where performance has become un-
lawful on the date called for. Contracts requiring payment in a stated
amount of gold were made payable in legal tender.'
Wartime price control, where it makes payment of a preexisting
contracted-for price unlawful, could achieve a similar result by providing
for substituted performance of payment at the maximum. Lawful pay-
ment would be substituted for unlawful payment without renegotiation
of that result by the parties. Buyers are not likely to complain since they
would pay less for commodities. That the seller receives less than his
original contract price would be due, not to preserving the contract on
the new basis, but to the OPA ceiling. Presumably the seller could
receive no more for the goods, were he to resell them on the "open"
market. Yet admittedly this may not be quite true where a seller is
able to "manipulate" a sale even within the price ceiling. For example,
a sale of commodities in carload lots may command a smaller unit
price than a sale in less than carload lots. A seller permitted freely to
renegotiate a carload lot contract, entered into before a regulation was
issued, will doubtless be able to sell, after the issuance of the regulation,
on a less than carload basis and perhaps net a greater unit price - a
manipulative practice which the OPA has already sought to control
in contracts made subsequent to a ceiling. 37
135. Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 294 U. S. 240 (1935) and cases in footnote
therein at 240. Maximum price control has been related to monetary control. See Freund,
The Emergency Price Control Act of 1942: Constitutional tssues (1942) 9 L, w & Co.-
Tmip. PRoB. 77, 81: "It is possible to view price control even more broadly, as a regula-
tion of the value of money."
136. Similarly, the constitutionality of rent control legislation which deprived the
landlord "in part at least of the power of profiting by the sudden influx of people . . .
and thus . . . of a part of the value of his property . . ." has been upheld. Block v.
Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135, 157 (1920).
137. OPA Price Interpretation Bull. No. 9, issued May 25, 1942, Price Interpretation
(91) in reference to Price Schedule No. 70 (lead scrap materials) : "The sale or deliv-
ery of antimonial lead in quantities less than requested by the buyer in order to enable the
seller to obtain a higher differential is a violation of the Schedule, provided the buyer
would have been willing to accept delivery in a single shipment. Furthermore the carload
maximum price applies when antimonial lead is sold in carload lots even though it is
shipped in less than carload lots." Statements with similar import can be found in Inter-
pretation (30) and Interpretation (102) in the same Bulletin. Other manipulative prac-
tices have been discouraged. See OPA Price Interpretation Bull. No. 5, issued March
15, 1942, in reference to Price Schedule No. S4 (radio receiver and phoncograph partsp
(price of re-orders shall not exceed price of original order even though the original order
covered a larger number of parts); OPA Price Interpretation Bull. No. 4, issucie
Feb. 16, 1942, in reference to Price Schedule No. 8 (pure nickel scrap) (price deter-
minations-premiums-combining different grades of same type of scrap for quantity
premium); OPA Price Interpretation Bull. No. 7, issued April 16, 1942, Interpretation
(69) in reference to Price Schedule No. 94 (western pine lumber) (violations-unrea-
sonably refusing to ship except in specified lengths and widths).
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The EPCA authorizes the Administrator to control such manipula-
tion along with speculative practices, hoarding,' 8 circumvention and
evasion. 139 The purpose of preserving contracts made prior to the issu-
ance of a regulation is, in the terms of the EPCA, to control these prac-
tices which otherwise may occur.
1 40
Indeed in isolated instances the Administrator has sought to control
the selling price of commodities under preexisting contracts entered into
at a time when such contracts were not affected by a ceiling. Coffee
roasters holding old contracts at lower than maximum prices were asked
to void such contracts and make voluntary payments at the higher ceiling
levels.14' This is, to be sure, the reverse price situation to that advocated
here, but it is to be noted that the Administrator's effort was to kee)
alive old purchases. In Maximum Price Regulation Number 174 there
is specific provision for the compulsory renegotiation of the price of
preexisting contracts." =
Such compulsory renegotiation does not run counter to the provision
in the EPCA that "Nothing in this Act shall be construed to require
any person to sell any commodity or to offer any accommodations for
rent."' 43 The requirement that a contract already made shall not be
discharged is precisely the opposite. It is not that the Administrator
would require a sale; it is that the Administrator would require that
a sale once made shall not fail.
Forced sales are dictated by and are in keeping with wartime econ-
omy." Evidence of such necessity is found in English 14  and United
States statutory law arfd regulation. 46  Priorities Regulation No. 1,147
from its inception, disallowed free choice of the seller to refuse to sell
defense orders. The limitation in Priorities Regulation No. 1 that the
sale must be at the regularly established price, 148 when coupled with a
138. EPCA §2(d).
139. EPCA §2(g), 2(h).
140. There is some legislative history to this effect. SEN. RFu. No. 931, 77th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1942) 17, 18.
141. OPA Release No. 487, Aug. 10, 1942.
142. Max. Price Reg. No. 174 [issued July 2, 1942 (freight car materials), C.F.R.,
tit. 32, c. 11, pt. 1390.51] provides: "The price at which any sale, delivery or offer to
sell was made between May 26, 1942, and July 2, 1942, shall be adjusted so as not to
exceed the maximum price herein permitted."
143. EPCA §4(d).
144. It is interesting to note that compulsory renegotiation of certain government
contracts is one of the means adopted to control wartime profits. Pub. L. No. 528, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. (April 28, 1942) (renegotiation under Sixth Supplemental National De-
fense Appropriations Act, 1942).
145. Goods and Services (Price Control) Act of 1941, 4 & 5 GEo. VI, c. 31, § 9.
146. See Comment (1942) 55 HARv. L. REv. 427 et seq.
147. C.F.R., tit. 32, c. 9, pt. 944.2.
148. C.F.R., tit. 32, c. 9, pt. 944.2(b) : "Any such order need not be accepted . . .
(3) if the person seeking to place such order is unwilling or unable to meet regularly
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price ceiling, probably means that in the usual case the seller is bound
to sell at no more than a governmentally fixed price."4 9 Actually the
OPA has already insisted on forced sales in certain situations.'r
The OPA is charged with the duty of administering our wartime price
economy. Whether the purposes for which the EPCA was enacted-
"* . to stabilize prices . . . prevent speculative, unwarranted, and
abnormal increases in prices . . . eliminate and prevent profiteering,
hoarding, manipulation, speculation . . . "'5 - necessitate stability of
contracts that predate ceilings is fundamentally an economic rather than
a legal matter. Not only should the Administrator, rather than the courts,
make the determination," 2 but under existing contract law it is difficult,
if not impossible, for a court to reason to a result that will ensure
contractual stability.' True, the Administrator's power to legislate
established prices and terms of sale or payment, but there shall be no discrimination
against such orders in establishing such prices and terms . ... "
149. But see Abels, Price Control in War and Emergency (1942) 90 U. oF PA. L
REv. 675, 686-688.
150. OPA Price Interpretation Bull. No. 7, issued April 16, 1942, Interpretation (69)
in reference to Price Schedule No. 94 (western pine lumber) : "The Schedule provides
that the price limitations therein established are not to be evaded by various methods,
one of which is unreasonably refusing to ship except in specified lengths or widths so
as to entitle the seller to a premium. Under ordinary circumstances, a seller would b2
'unreasonably refusing to ship except in specified lengths' if, on an order for random
lengths of common grades, he shipped only 10' to 16' lengths and charged the higher
price allowed for latter lengths."
151. EPCA § 1(a).
152. Commons, Legislative and Administratihe Reasoning in Economics (1942) 24
J. OF FzAmr EcoN. 369, 384, states: "An administrative department alone can meet prompt-
ly the 'adjustments' needed to ward off inflations and deflations of prices, or bring relief
promptly in time of deflation." See also Cooke, The Legal Content of the Profit Con-
cept (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 436, 437.
153. The question of the legal effect of maximum price control on preexisting con-
tracts was raised in Vorld War I under the Lever Act. The Lever Act was held not
to apply retroactively to preexisting contracts. Standard Chemicals & Metals Corp. v.
Waugh Chemical Corp., 231 N. Y. 51, 131 N. E. 566 (1921). Under §4(a) of the
EPCA, note 10 supra, there is statutory authority for the application of price control to
contracts that predate a regulation, even though the current price regulations do not
expressly state that they apply to contracts entered into prior to the date of issuance. Cf.
In re Kramer & Uchitelle, Inc., 28S N. Y. 467, 43 N. E. (2d) 493 (1942) (price schedule,
issued under Executive Order No. 8734 establishing the Office of Price Administration and
Civilian Supply, was by its express terms applicable to preexisting contracts; Executive
Order contained no such express provisions; performance held discharged without dis-
cussion as to whether the Executive Order authorized price schedule having such a re-
troactive effect). While the general rule (note 25 supra) is that a change in domestic
law making performance invalid discharges a contract, it has been suggested that the
buyer might hold the contract open by offering the lawful price. See Ginsburg, TheRnzergency Price Control Act of 1942: Basic Authority and Sanctions (1942) 9 LAw
& CoNrEmp. PROB. 22, 51: "May the buyer, however, insist upon his contract by offer-
ing the lawful price? The answer is likely to depend upon xwhether the contract price
has been so substantially reduced that to require performance by the seller would be to
insist upon a contract which the parties never made." But any payment less than the
contract price, if permitted, would be the maling of a contract upon which the parties
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validly' must be found within the Act; otherwise the regulation may be
subject to a charge of "ultra vires."' 5  The view here taken is that the
power to regulate or prohibit speculative or manipulative practices or
hoarding, and the declaration that "Regulations, orders and requirements
under this Act may contain such provisions as the Administrator deems
necessary to prevent the circumvention or evasion thereof," ' are ample
authority for the Administrator.
Wartime economy is geared, in part, to particular commodities. The
fact that almost without exception each price regulation and each War
Production Board order concerns a particular commodity or limited
group of commodities amply indicates not only that different com-
modities have different functions in the economy but that each may
need different treatment in certain respects. Economic considerations
may also require different price treatment for manufacturers, wholesalers,
and retailers. It may be that preexisting contracts between some types
of buyers and sellers of certain goods should be discharged while other
contracts for different goods between a different class of buyers and
sellers should be kept alive at a newly legislated maximum. These and
other considerations 1 ' are, however, economic not legal. And hence these
questions should be decided by the Administrator, not the courts.
never agreed. Further, it is doubtful that the doctrine of substantial performance is
applicable where price control makes it illegal for the seller to be recompensed by the
buyer who has failed to render complete performance under the terms of the contract.
See 3 WILuIsToN, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936) § 805. But see In re Kramer & Uchitelle,
Inc., 288 N. Y. 467, 472, 43 N. E. (2d) 493, 496 (1942) (dissenting opinion of Lehman,
Ch. J).
154. See Rava, Procedure in Emergency Price Fixing (1942) 40 Micu. L. Rv. 937,
948: "Price fixing is rule making .... ." See also Hynning, Price Control and the
Profit System (1942) 9 U. OF CnI. L. REv. 561, 572-578.
155. See Fuchs, Concepts and Policies in Anglo-American Administrative Law
Theory (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 538, 559-563; Cooper, Administrative Justice and the Role
of Discretion (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 577, 589; Lee, Legislative and Interpretive Reg.
lations (1940) 29 GEo. L. J. 1, 21-24; Vom BAuR, FEDERAL ADmiNisTRATiVE LAW (1942)
§ 499.
156. EPCA §2(g).
157. It might be found wise, from an economic point of view, to allow the contract
to remain open at the lawful price at the option of the buyer, or perhaps at the option
of the seller. In addition, there may be circumstances in which the seller ought not be
obliged to hold the contract open. For example, the seller may have been willing, in a
free price economy, to take a credit risk at an abnormally high price. To compel a
seller to sell to such a poor risk buyer at the market or at a ceiling price may be an
unwarranted hardship.
The English price control statute, while compelling sales, makes certain exceptions
if the sale
"(a) be contrary to the normal practice of his business; or
(b) involve a breach of some obligation lawfully binding on him; or
(c) interfere with arrangements made by him for an orderly disposal of his stocks,
amongst his regular customers."
Goods and Services (Price Control) Act of 1941, 4 & 5 GEo. VI, c. 31, § 9(2).
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Though numerous commodities have already been regulated without
providing for contractual stability, new regulations are currently being
issued. These new regulations might well provide for contractual sta-
bility. Further, contracts made at maximum prices under existing ceilings
will be discharged if the ceiling is lowered, unless the regulation itself
seeks to keep the contract alive. Regulations when amended to reduce
ceilings might provide that contracts theretofore made be performed at
the lowered price.
CONCLUSION
The EPCA and the regulations go to the point of setting the formula
for determining which contracts are lawful and which unlawful. Claims
of private parties push inquiry beyond a determination of the "legality"
of their dealings. At present, that inquiry is made in, and the formula
for determining the ultimate solution rests with, the courts. When the
traditional formulas of contract law are applied to cases likely to arise
under wartime price control, uncertainties will result, some of which
we have tried to resolve.
More important, however, is the fact that the courts in settling the
rights between private parties determine either that money damages or
goods will or will not pass from defendant to plaintiff. Money and
credit in relation to goods are the subject matter of price control. To
the extent that the courts and not the OPA determine the basis of dis-
tribution of the money in relation to goods, the courts and not the OPA
are establishing price control criteria. It is hardly to be expected that
the courts will always reach the result which control of inflation demands.
Methods and facilities of investigation open to an administrative agency
are not available to the courts.
If proper administrative regulation were adopted, the Administrator
could control the economic effects of transactions in a heretofore admin-
istratively uncontrolled sphere of activity, and at the same time could
avoid the uncertainties engendered by the discharge of contracts by
normal operation of law.
1942l
